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Now, make no mistake, our nation is still threatened by terrorists
...
But we

have to recognize that the threat has shifted and evolved

from the one that came to our shores on 9/11. With a decade of
experience now to draw from, this is the moment to ask ourselves
hard questions - about the nature of today's threats and how we
should confront them.'
Justly or not, drones have become a provocative symbol of
American power, running
roughshod over national sovereignty
2
innocents.
killing
and
I. INTRODUCTION

The extraterritorial use of Remotely Piloted Aircrafts (RPAs), more
popularly known in the media as "drones," 3 in targeted killings is rapidly
I. President Barrack Obama, Remarks at the National Defense University (May 23,
2013), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2 013/05/23/remarks-presidentnational-defense-university [hereinafter President Obama Speech].
2. Jo Becker & Scott Shane, Secret "Kill List" Proves a Test ofObama 's Principlesand
Will, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-

in-war-on-al-qaeda.html?pagewanted%253Dall&_r=0.
3. Although more commonly known "drones" in the media, the use of that term implies
completely autonomous robots flying around and dropping bombs without human interaction.
Because that image is inaccurate and misleading, in 2010, the U.S. Air Force announced that
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increasing, in the number of countries resorting to this use of force, the
locations where countries conduct the operations, as well as in numbers
of operations by those countries. The United States, the United Kingdom,
and Israel rely on existing legal principles to justify their RPA targeted
killing operations. The way these countries are interpreting and applying
the legal principles will likely shape the future of RPA operations by
other countries. This Article is an exploration of how the three countries
interpret and apply international law to their RPA targeted killing
operations, in an attempt to capture the similarities and distinctions, and
to provide insight into how best to answer the criticisms levied at the
operations and improve their legality.
RPAs are used for operations other than targeted killings. They can be
used to collect intelligence on suspected terrorists by conducting roundthe-clock surveillance on those targets.4 They can operate in
environments that the typical soldier cannot and perform assessments of
the battleground both pre- and post-combat.5 The focus of this Article,
however, is on the RPAs that are used as lethal weapons, loaded with
drones or "Unmanned Aerial Vehicles" (UAVs) will officially be called "Remotely Piloted
Aircrafts." Amaani Lyle, Air Force Officials Announce Remotely PilotedAircraft Pilot Training
Pipeline, A.F. NEWS, June 9, 2010, http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123208561; Philip
Hammond, In Defence of Drones, GUARDIAN, Dec. 17, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/
This change in
commentisfree/2013/dec/18/in-defence-of-drones-keep-civilians-troops-safe.
terminology reflects the U.S. military official recognition that the vehicles are not "unmanned,"
but rather piloted remotely by trained military officers. Colonel Dawn M.K. Zoldi, Protecting
Security andPrivacy: An Analytical Frameworkfor Airborne Domestic Imagery, 70 A.F.L. REv.
1, 3 n.1 (2013). MOD officials in the United Kingdom also stress the use of the label "remotely
piloted air system" instead of "drone" because "[t]hough physically unmanned, the aircraft is
guided and controlled by a team of highly trained people. Pilots, sensor operators and analysts all
make decisions in real time, just like the crew of a traditional aircraft." U.K. MOD, THE UK
APPROACH TO UNMANNED AIRCRAFT, JOINT DOCTRINE NOTE 2/11 203 (Mar. 2011) [hereinafter
J.D.N. 2/11].
4. See Jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW YORKER, Oct. 26, 2009, http://www.new
yorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa-fact-mayer (noting that the Predator RPA can hover
above a target for up to forty hours before refueling); Afsheen Radsan & Richard Murphy,
Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Carefor CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REv. 1201,
1203 (2011).
A small drone - unburdened by a pilot who must protect himself from enemy
fire - can hover unseen above a potential target for many hours. The drone's
powerful cameras gather ground information that is instantly beamed to the
United States for assessment. Plus, infrared and other sensor may add to the
drone's capabilities.
Id.
5. U.S. Dep't of Def., UnmannedSystems IntegratedRoadmap FY2013-2038, Reference
3.1, 308-10 (2013), available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/DODNumber: 14-S-0553,
USRM-2013.pdf [hereinafter DOD 25 Year Roadmap].
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munitions flown to target and kill6 particular terrorists. RPAs allow pilots
to remotely target and kill terrorists with a precision strike, from a remote
location, and ideally without having to participate in a long drawn-out
combat.
When comparing how the three countries legally justify the use of
RPAs in targeted killings, some interesting points come to light. First,
while the U.S. RPA targeted killing program is more expansive in
numbers of locations where it conducts the operations, a look at each
location individually demonstrates that the United States may not be
taking a stance that is any more aggressive than Israel regarding the
lawfulness of the use of force in that country (/us ad bellum), and both

countries may be taking a more aggressive position than the United
Kingdom.
Second, in answering questions related to International Humanitarian
Law (JIL), the countries stated public positions vary while application
of the IHL principles demonstrates striking similarities in the operations.
Specifically, variance is present in answers to the questions of whether
armed conflicts with terrorists are international or non-international
armed conflicts for purposes of the applicability of certain Geneva
Conventions, as well as how to label and thus treat terrorists under IHL.
The differences are based on both the situational differences in the three
countries' armed conflicts with terrorists, as well as the various
International Conventions to which each State is a party. However, when
conducting RPA targeted killing operations against individual terrorists,
all three countries apply the rules of IHL similarly, as discussed in further
6. There is no accepted definition of "targeted killing" in the literature. For example, the
legal advisor for the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) defines targeted killings
as "[t]he use of lethal force attributable to a subject of international law with the intent,
premeditation and deliberation to kill individually selected persons who are not in the physical
custody of those targeting them." NILS MELZER, TARGETED KILLING IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(2008). Scholars have also labeled them "extra-judicial" killings, see, e.g., Richard Murphy &
Afsheen Radsan, Due Process and TargetedKilling of Terrorists, 31 CARDozo L. REV. 405, 406
(2009) (noting that some opponents of RPA operations have defined them as the "extra-judicial,
premeditated killing by a state of a specifically identified person not in its custody"). But see
Amos Guiora, TargetedKilling as Active Self-Defense, 36 CASE W. RES. J.INT'L L. 329-30 (2004)
(distinguishing the concepts of targeted and extra-judicial killing is "critical" because while extrajudicial killing is unlawful, targeted killings are not and occur "when arrest of the individual poses
an extraordinary operational risk"). For purposes of this Article, the following definition is
instructive: "the intentional killing of a specific civilian or unlawful combatant who cannot
reasonably be apprehended, who is taking a direct part in hostilities, the targeting done at the
direction of the state, in the context of an international or non-international armed conflict." GARY
D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW IN WAR 538
(2010). This Article is limited to RPA targeted killing operations, and thus, "RPA targeted killing
operations" will mean the intentional killing of a specific combatant or civilian participating in
hostilities by means of an RPA, which is directed by a State, in the context of an international or
non-international armed conflict.
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detail below.
Beyond IHL, especially interesting is a deep dive into how each
country applies certain principles from International Human Rights Law
(IHRL). Although this is a separate set of rules than, and sometimes even
contradictory to, the rules of IHL, all three countries look to IHRL in
various ways to guide RPA targeted killing operations, in a few
surprisingly similar ways, sometimes even imposing higher burdens than
required by IHL. One example is the expectation of a zero civilian
casualty rate by the United States and the United Kingdom in any
particular operation. Even so, in order to demonstrate compliance with
IHL, all three countries need to improve in the areas of transparency and
accountability. In the specific area of transparency into and accountability
of civilian casualties, the United States may be lagging behind the other
two countries, providing the greatest area for potential improvement.
After the introduction in Part I of this Article, Part II presents
background of each country's use of RPAs and what is known about the
extent of their operations around the world. Part III gives an overview of
the relevant legal framework and also introduces the various relevant
Conventions to which each country is a party that shapes their RPA
operations. While RPA targeted killing operations are governed by both
international and domestic laws, this Article is limited to the application
of international law by the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel.
Part IV begins an in-depth look ofjus ad bellum, or the lawfulness of the
use of force, questions that arise with the use of RPAs in targeted killing
operations. Part V then discusses jus in bello principles, or those that
apply during an armed conflict to regulate the conduct of the parties, and
gives further detail about how specific provisions of the Conventions
introduced in Part III impact each countries' operations. After discussing
the application of the principles in the United States, United Kingdom,
and Israel's RPA targeted killing operations, all Parts present some
observations gleaned from a comparison of the different countries and
suggests areas of improvement. Part VI offers concluding thoughts and
makes recommendations on how to improve accountability and
transparency through the use of Individualized Threat Findings (ITFs),
more extensive post-operations investigations, and the public release of
limited information about RPA targeted killing operations.
II. RPA USE AROUND THE WORLD TODAY

A. United States
The United States first developed RPAs in the early- 1960s, as a
possible alternative to the manned reconnaissance aircraft, U-2s, which
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were being shot down over the Soviet Union. 7 In the 1970s, military
weapons development projects began to research and test arming
unmanned vehicles with targeting capabilities. 8 But, the United States
on intelligence-gathering
largely spent the funding for RPA development
9
capabilities rather than as weapons systems.
Fast-forward to 1998, when President Bill Clinton issued the order
authorizing the use of lethal force in self-defense against al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan, specifically those individuals suspected of bombing the
American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.' 0 At that time, the United
States used cruise missiles fired from a naval war ship rather than RPAs. l1
The cruise missiles hit the intended targets, but failed to kill Bin Laden
or any other terrorist leader. 12
Though this operation faced some criticism, government officials
were already exploring the option of using RPAs to target terrorists
abroad and the operation helped open the door for targeting specific
terrorists with RPAs as the United States engaged in its armed conflict
with terrorists. By August 2001, the National Security Council under
President George Bush concluded that it was legal for the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to kill Bin Laden or one of his deputies with
an RPA, specifically the MQ-1 Predator.' 3 On September 4, 2001,
President Bush's chief advisors approved a draft presidential directive to
arm the Predator with missiles so that it could be used to target and kill
Osama Bin Laden or his chief lieutenants.14 Immediately following
September 11, President Bush issued a presidential directive related to
targeted killings that was broader than the one issued by President Clinton
in terms of who could be targeted. 15 It extended to al Qaeda members
other than the top leaders and went beyond the boundaries of
Afghanistan. 16
The RPA strike often cited as the first known RPA targeted killing
7.

For a detailed discussion of the history of RPAs, see Thomas Ehrhard, Michell Inst.,

Air Force UAVS: The Secret History (2010), http://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/

AFA/6379b747-7730-4f82-9b45-atc8Od6c8fdb/Uploadedlmages/Mitchell%20Publications/Air
%20Force%20UAVs.pdf.
8.

Id. at 20-21.

9. Id.
10. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11
Commission Report 117 (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 Comm'n Report].
11. See id.; Gabriella Blum & Philip Heymann, Law and Policy of Targeted Killing, I
HARV. NAT'L SEC. J. 145, 150 (2010).
12. Id.
13. Robert Chesney, Military-IntelligenceConvergence and the Law of the Title JO/Title
50 Debate, 5 J. OF NAT'L SEC. LAW & POL'Y 539, 561 (2012).

14. 9/11 Comm'n Report, supra note 10, at 213.
15. Blum & Heymann, supra note 11, at 150.
16. Id.
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strike took place in Yemen over a year later, in November 2002.17 This
strike is believed to have been a joint operation involving the CIA, from
its headquarters located in Langley, Virginia, and the U.S. Air Force
operations center in Djibouti, Africa.' 8 For years, this strike did not
generate much controversy.
The use of RPAs to target and kill terrorists located overseas has
increased dramatically under President Barrack Obama, and into areas9
outside those zones of active hostilities in Iraq and Afghanistan.'
Estimates from two government watchdog groups on the number of times
the United States has used RPAs to target and kill terrorists vary
anywhere between 392 and 405 in Pakistan, 72 and 204 in Yemen, and 6
and 9 in Somalia.20 In addition to the wide variance in number of strikes
provided by government watchdog groups, the number of militants and
civilians killed ranges widely as well. 2 1 As more and more sources began

reporting larger numbers of RPA targeted killing operations in the years
since 2002, scrutiny and criticism of the operations grew.
Some critics argue, for example, there is no legal basis for the United
States to be conducting RPA targeted killing operations outside areas of
active hostilities because doing so is a violation of that nation's
17. Chesney, supra note 13, at 567.
18. Id; see also Phillip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders, 2 HARV.
NAT'L SEC. J. 283, 329 (2011) (noting that the secret CIA program is conducted by the CIA using
unmanned aerial vehicles and began the strike in Yemen in November 2002 (internal quotation
omitted)).
19. The U.S. government has not yet released an unclassified list of all targeted killings
conducted by the United States. Therefore, in the absence of complete information about RPA
operations, various media and other investigative sources have tried to collect data. For example,
the New America Foundation lists strikes on an online database, see NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION,
http://natsec.newamerica.net/about

(last visited Jan. 2, 2015); BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE

JOURNALISM, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2014/01/29/get-the-data-pakistani-governm
ents-secret-report-on-drone-strikes/ (listing the strikes in Pakistan) (last visited Jan. 2, 2015).
However, without verification from any governmental source and since some information is
gained from individuals who have potential motives for providing information damaging to the
United States, it is impossible to know how much of the statistical information they publish is
accurate. Scholars repeatedly comment on the difficulty in assessing legality presented by such
secrecy in operations. See, e.g., Gregory McNeal, TargetedKilling and Accountability, 102 GEO.
L.J. 681 (2014).
20.

See NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION,

JOURNALISM,

21.

supra note

19; BUREAU

OF INVESTIGATIVE

supra note 19.

See, e.g., NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, supra note 19 (listing the total number

individuals killed in Pakistan between 2206 and 3583, including between 258 and 307 civilians
killed, and the total number individuals killed in Yemen between 820 and 1082 individuals,
including between 81 and 87 civilians); BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, supra note 19

(estimating the total number individuals killed in Pakistan between 2400 and 3888, including
between 416 and 959 civilians, the total number of individuals killed in Yemen anywhere between
371 and 1094, including between 64 and 151 civilians, and the total number of individuals killed
in the Somalia strikes to be between 16 and 30, including 0 to I civilian).
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sovereignty. Other critics of RPA targeted killing operations cite the
high numbers of civilian casualties caused by the strikes as evidence that
they are not as precise as government and military officials claim. The
lack of clarity regarding how many civilians inadvertently killed by RPAs
aimed at terrorists provides the biggest concern to many who oppose the
RPA targeted killing program. The civilian casualty rates are discussed
in more detail in Part V.B below.
Some critics of RPA targeted killings operations assert that these
operations cause severe psychological impacts on the civilian
population. 23 Professors and law students from Stanford and New York
University law schools completed a thorough study of some of the lessreported negative effects of RPA targeted killing operations on civilians
in Pakistan. 24 According to the report, which included research combined
with more than 130 witness interviews, current U.S. RPA operations are
extremely damaging and counterproductive.2 5 For example, they found
that RPA strikes cause negative consequences on the economic, social,
and cultural activities of local residents, as well as their mental health,
educational opportunities in an area of high illiteracy rates, property
damage
and extensive economic hardship, and an erosion of community
26
trust.

In response to such criticisms, senior government officials began to
defend the legality of the U.S. use of RPAs overseas to the public.
Specifically, in his speech accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in December
2009, President Obama affirmatively stated that, while "all nations strong and weak alike - must adhere to standards that govern the use of
force,... I reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend [the]
22. Rise of Drones II: Unmanned Systems and the Future of Warfare: Hearing before the
U.S. House Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, I11 th Cong. 2 (Apr. 28,
2010) (written testimony of Mary Ellen O'Connell, Professor, University of Notre Dame Law
School), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/subcommittees/NS-Subcommitte

e/4.28.10-Drones II/OConnellStatement.pdf.
23. Phil Shiner & Dan Carey, Public Interest Lawyers, The Legality of the UK's Use of
Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 23 (2013), http://www.publicinterestlawyers.co.uk/go_files/
files/ME1IAPC38OF3.pdf; Chris Cole, Drone Wars UK, Submission from Drone Wars UK to the
Defence Select Committee Inquiry 'Towards the Next Defence and Security Review' on the Use
of Armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) 9 (2013), http://dronewarsuk.files.wordpress.
com/21013/04/dwuk-submission-to-dsc-april-2013.pdf.
24. See Stanford Law School International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic
& Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law, Living Under Drones: Death, Injury, and Trauma
to Civilians From US Drone Practices in Pakistan 74-101 (Sept. 2012), http://livingunderdrones.

org/.
25.

Id.

26. Id.See also Mary Dobbing & Chris Cole, Drone Wars UK, Israel and the Drone Wars,
16-17 (2014), http://dronewarsuk.files.wordpress.com/2014/01/israel-and-the-drone-wars.pdf
(noting the severe psychological effects that RPA strikes have on the civilian population in the
Gaza Strip, especially the children, who live under constant fear of the attacks).
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nation." 27 Then, in March 2010, in a speech at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law, then-Legal Advisor to the
Department of State Harold Koh discussed the legal standards that the
government applies to its use of RPAs for lethal operations, which are
discussed throughout this Article. 28 In that speech, he did not
acknowledge where the operations were taking place.
Continuing throughout 2011 and 2012, senior government officials
made speeches proclaiming the legality of the President's unilateral use
of force overseas. 29 A specific example is a May 2013 letter to Congress
from Attorney General Eric Holder. 30 In an apparent attempt to increase
transparency, he said that the President directed him to disclose certain
information that was previously classified.3 ' Specifically that, between
September 2009 and the date of the letter, the United States targeted and
that
killed one U.S. citizen in Yemen and killed three other citizens over
32
States.
United
the
by
targeted
specifically
not
were
same time who
In addition to Yemen, the U.S. Government admits that operations
also occur in Pakistan and Somalia. Without disclosing details about
specific RPA strikes, the President first acknowledged in May 2013 that
27. President Barack Obama, The Nobel Peace Prize 2009: Nobel Lecture (Dec. 10, 2009),
available at http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/obama-lectureen.
html.
28. Harold Koh, U.S. Dep't of State Legal Advisor, Remarks at the Annual Meeting of the
American Society of International Law: The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar.
25, 2010), availableat http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
29. See, e.g., John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Harvard Law School Program on Law and Security:
Strengthening our Security by Adhering to our Values and Laws (Sept. 16, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/09/16/remarks-john-o-brennan-strengtheningour-security-adhering-our-values-an (noting that the United States "reserve[s] the right to take
unilateral action if or when other governments are unwilling or unable to take the necessary
actions themselves"); Eric Holder, Attorney General, Remarks at Northwestern University School
of Law (Mar. 5, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech1203051.html (articulating the test for using lethal force against a U.S. citizen located overseas
who is actively engaged in planning to kill Americans); Stephen W. Preston, CIA General
Counsel, Remarks at Harvard Law School: On the Rule of Law (Apr. 10, 2012), available at
http://www.cfr.org/rule-of-law/cia-general-counsel-stephen-prestons-remarks-rule-law-april-201
2/p27912 (outlining the legal authorities that give the CIA the authority to conduct RPA
operations as well as the international and national laws that require compliance in execution of
those operations); John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism, Remarks at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: The Ethics
and Efficacy of the President's Counterterrorism Strategy (Apr. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/brennanspeech/ (discussing that the RPA targeted killing
operations are legal, ethical, wise, and subject to rigorous standards of review).
30. Letter from Eric Holder, Attorney General, to The Honorable Patrick J. Leahy,
Chairman, U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary 1-2 (May 22, 2013), http:/www.justice.gov/
slideshow/AG-letter-5-22-13.pdf [hereinafter Holder Letter].
31. Id.
32. Id.
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operations have been and will continue to be carried out in Pakistan,
Somalia and Yemen where terrorists hide in the "most distant and
unforgiving places on Earth," the "state lacks the capacity or will to take
action,.., and it's. . . not possible for America to simply deploy a team
of Special Forces to capture every terrorist."33
Additionally, the United States expanded its RPA intelligencegathering capability into other African countries, including Mali, Niger,
Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, and Djibouti.34 The President specifically
acknowledged that the United States provided "aid to the French-led
intervention" against al Qaeda in Mali.35 Media reports confirm that the
United States operated surveillance operations in the countries listed
above and did so pursuant to agreements signed with those countries in
36
order to improve intelligence collection of terrorists operating there.
Some critics express concern that the agreements could open the door for
armed RPAs to operate in those countries, but the understanding is that
agreements between the37United States and the African countries are for
surveillance RPAs only.
B. UnitedKingdom
38
The United Kingdom deployed RPAs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
According to publicly-available information, the U.K. military began
training with U.S. forces already flying the armed RPAs around January
2004. 39 In 2007, the U.K. Royal Air Force became part of a squadron

33. President Obama Speech, supra note 1.
34. Paul Harris & Afua Hirsch, US Signs Deal with Niger to OperateMilitary Drones in
West African State, GuARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/29/
niger-approves-american-surveillance-drones.
35. Id.at 3; see also Eric Schmitt, Drones in Niger Reflect New US. Tack on Terrorism,
N.Y. TIMES (July 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/1 1/world/africa/drones-in-nigerreflect-new-us-approach-in-terror-fight.html?pagewanted=all& r=0
(discussing the RPA
surveillance operations being conducted from the small U.S. base in Niger that are providing
intelligence to aid the French effort in Mali).
36. Harris & Hirsch, supra note 34.
37. Id.
38. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Rep. on the Promotionand Protection of
Human Rights andFundamentalFreedoms While CounteringTerrorism, U.N. Doc. A/68/389,
29-31, 37 (Sept. 18, 2013) (by Ben Emmerson) [hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report
(Emmerson)]. See also Robert Wall, UK Conducts First Reaper Drone Strike Controlledfrom
Britain, BLOOMBERG NEWS (May 1, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-01/u-kconducts-firsts-reaper-drone-strike-controlled-from-britain.html (discussing the first RPA piloted
from Britain to support ground operations in Afghanistan and that 2150 RPA missions were
conducted by the United Kingdom from a U.S. Air Force base in Nevada between October 2006
and December 31, 2012).
39.

Craig Hoyle, UK Cheers the Reaper UAV, FLIGHTGLOBAL.COM (June 16, 2008),

http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/uk-cheers-the-reaper-uav-224622/.
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located at a U.S. Air Force base in Nevada, formed specifically to 4operate
°
remotely-piloted air systems alongside U.S. Air Force squadrons.
Between 2007 and December 2013, the Royal Air Force "amassed
54,000 flying hours in support of coalition forces in Afghanistan and...
fired just 459 precision weapons," according to representatives from the
Royal Air Force. 4 1 The first recorded U.K. participation in an RPA
targeted killing operation is believed to be May 2008.42 As with most
statistics cited by government officials throughout this Article, sources
dispute this number as too low. 43 For example, one source asserts that
"[r]ecent figures released by the USAF and the RAF show that US and
UK forces have launched
over 1,400 weapons from UAVs in Afghanistan
44
in the past five years.,
The United States and the United Kingdom also used RPAs during the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation in Libya in
2011. 4 5 Based on publicly-available information, the United Kingdom
has not conducted any RPA targeted killing operations outside of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Libya thus far, but the United Kingdom may be aiding
U.S. RPA targeted killing operations in other ways.46 The British
Ministry of Defence (MOD) was sued for providing intelligence
information to the United States to help identify and locate drone targets
in Pakistan.47 Furthermore, "[a]ccording to the UN Special Rapporteur
and other well-informed sources, there is serious discussion taking place
within the [MOD] about deploying the British Reaper to Africa to help
with the French counter-insurgency operations there." 48 MOD officials
deny that there are plans to send the reapers to Africa.49

40. British Embassy Washington, Ambassador Westmacott Visits RAF Squadron in
Nevada, Gov.UK (Dec. 18, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/world-location-news/ambas
sador-westmacott-visits-raf-squadron-in-nevada.
41.

Id.

42.
43.

Hoyle, supra note 39.
Cole, supra note 23 (citing Chris Woods & Alice Ross, Revealed: US and Britain

Launched 1,200 DroneStrikes in Recent Wars, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Dec. 4,

2012), www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/12/04/revealed-us-and-britain-launched-1200-dron
e-strikes-in-recent-wars).
44. Id.
45. Special Rapporteur Report (Emmerson), supra note 38, 36.
46. Id.
47. Cole, supra note 23, at 5; see also Sylvia Hui, US DroneStrikes: UK GovernmentSued
for Assisting Covert Attacks, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
2012/03/12/us-drone-strikes-uk n 1338640.html (explaining that the suit is not based on
allegations that the British military conducted the RPA targeted killing operations in Pakistan, but
that they provided locational information to the United States so that it would target and kill
terrorists in Pakistan).
48. Cole, supra note 23, at 2.
49. J.D.N. 2/11, supra note 3, 101.
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C. Israel
Israel uses RPAs in its operations in Judea, Samaria, and the Gaza
Strip. 50 Israel's first surveillance RPA was created in the aftermath of
Israel's 1973 war with Egypt and Syria.5 ' In the early 1990s, Israel again
52
used RPAs for surveillance in operations against Hezbollah in Lebanon.
targeted killings to be a part of the
In late 2000, Israel officially declared
53
terrorism.
against
fight
overall
Although Israel officially acknowledges targeted killings as part of
Israel's fight against terrorism, identifying the exact number of RPA
targeted killing operations conducted by Israel is very difficult. Israel
employs various means in its "war against terrorism," and thus, it is
unclear exactly when the first targeted killing by an RPA occurred.54 One
source lists an October 2004 strike as the first reliable report of RPA
targeted killing operation. 55 On its website, the Israeli Defense Forces
(IDF) now readily admits RPAs are frequently used as part of its armed
conflict with Hamas, but there is no information confirming or denying
that October 2004 was the first strike.56
Additionally, whether to count a certain operation as an RPA targeted
killing operations is not as easy as it seems. For example, sometimes only
RPAs are used in a targeted killing operation, but in other operations,
RPAs will provide surveillance which is then followed by a piloted
aircraft that actually bombs the target.57
Similar to the United States and the United Kingdom, the Israeli
Government has not provided unclassified information to the public
listing where all RPA targeted killing operations have or are taking place.
50. H.C.J. 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Israel v. Gov't of Israel 57(6) PD
21 [2005] (Isr.) [hereinafter H.C.J. Opinion].

16,

51. Scott Wilson, In Gaza, Lives Shaped by Drones, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-gaza-lives-shaped-by-drones/20 11/
11/ 30/gIQAjaP6OOdarint.html.

52. Dobbing & Cole, supra note 26, at 10.
53. Blum & Heymann, supra note 11, at 151; see also Alston, supra note 18, at 407 (noting
that, although in the 1990s Israel rejected the accusation that its military engaged in targeted
killings, in November 2002, the Israeli Government confirmed the existence of the policy
justifying targeted killings in self-defense and under the laws of armed conflict).
54. H.C.J. Opinion, supranote 50, 2.
55. Arieh O'Sullivan & Khaled Abu Toameh, IDF Relying on Use of Killer Drones in
Gaza, JERUSALEM POST (Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-101814393.html.
56. See, e.g., Israeli Defense Forces, Army of the Future: IDF's Unmanned Vehicles, IDF

BLOG (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.idfblog.com/2012/02/28/army-future-idfs-unmanned-vehic
les/.
57. See Israeli Defense Forces, IsraeliAir Force:Bombing Gaza or PinpointStrikes?, IDF
BLOG (Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.idfblog.com/2012/03/11/bombing-gaza-or-pinpoint-strikes/

(discussing that "pinpoint strikes" are carried out by both the manned F-I16 aircraft and the
unmanned Delilah).
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459

IDF only publicly admits conducting targeted killings in the Gaza Strip,
Judea, and Samaria, but some sources also claim Israel is conducting
RPA strikes in Sudan.58 The available sources on any Israeli operations
in Sudan are very few and, according
to those sources, the IDF declined
59
to comment on the allegations.
D. Comparingthe Countries: The Futureof RPA Targeted
Killing Operations
Though Israel and the United Kingdom also use RPAs, there can be
no denying that the U.S. RPA targeted killing program is more expansive
60
than the other two countries, both in locations and number of strikes.
Military documents from both the United States and United Kingdom
highlight plans to continue to obtain and expand the use of RPAs in the
future.6 ' In fact, RPAs are so valuable to the military community that the
U.K. Defence Department has noted that they are "one of the few
capability areas to receive increased funding over the next decade." 62
Government officials claim that the tactical success is gained at lower
costs to military troops, both financially and mentally, by not sending
them in harms' way. Proponents of RPAs claim that not only are they
tactically successful at hitting their targets, but they also are successful in
causing fear among terrorists. 64 RPA operations are "decapitating the
leadership of the terrorist groups" and "independent reports confirm that
the strikes have hampered terrorist activities."65 In 2009, for example, a
reporter for the New York Times published a multi-part news article
describing his experience when held in captivity by the Taliban for over
58. See Dobbing & Cole, supranote 26, at 12 (claiming that an Israeli drone carried out an
airstrike against an allegedly Gaza-bound Iranian arms convoy traveling through Sudan in 2009);
Elad Benari, Report: Israeli Drone Destroyed Weapons in Sudan Last Month, Arutz Sheva,
ISRAEL NAT'L NEWS (Oct. 26, 2012), http://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/
161354#.U 1GCdSDD9jo (describing an Israeli RPA on a convoy traveling south of the capitol of
Sudan that destroyed 200 tons of munitions intended for Gaza).
59. Dobbing & Cole, supra note 26, at 12.
60. Interestingly, the United States initially publicly condemned Israel's targeted killings
as "extrajudicial killings" and because the "[U.S.] government is very clearly on record as against
targeted assassinations." See Mayer, supra note 4, at 6.
61. See generallyDOD 25 Year Roadmap, supra note 5; and J.D.N. 2/11, supra note 3,
404.
62. J.D.N. 2/11, supra note 3, 404.
63. SOLIS, supra note 6, at 541 ("Even considering the predictable collateral damage, the
effectiveness of [RPAs] mated with Hellfire missiles, combined with their relatively low cost and
zero exposure of friendly personnel, assures their continued use.").
64. See generally Blum & Heymann, supra note 11, at 167.
65. Radsan & Murphy, supra note 4, at 1228-29. See also Blum & Heymann, supra note
11, at 167 (noting that the "demonstration of superiority in force and resolve may also dishearten
the supporters of terrorism.").
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seven months.66 He describes how the RPA strikes have "created a
paranoia among the Taliban." 67 Therefore, they moved around in secrec'68
and darkness and were very suspicious of locals who surrounded them.
It is unavoidable that other countries have or will also eventually
obtain the technology. A 2012 report from the U.S. General
Accountability Office indicates that the current number of countries who
have acquired some sort of unmanned aerial vehicle system might be as
high as seventy-six. 69 Evidence
exists that China and Iran are already
70
developing the technology.
It is also unavoidable that other countries will look to the biggest users
of RPAs in targeted killing operations to inform their practices, including
the United States. 7 1 "The United States is the first to self-consciously
declare itself at war with a non-state terrorist organization that potentially
spans the globe. Its actions establish a reference point for state practice
that will likely be mimicked '7by
others and inform the development of
2
customary international law."
A deep-dive into the use of RPAs by the United Kingdom and Israel
in comparison to the United States throughout this Article illustrates not
only how the countries look to IHL to shape the legality of their RPA
targeted killing operations, but how the application of both IHL and IHRL
principles works in actual operations. Conducting the operations involves
a very complex process that includes reliance on historical legal
precedence, as well as observations of the other countries' struggles with
similar armed conflicts, while facing the practicalities of an everchanging enemy and landscape of armed conflict surrounding that enemy.
The next Part will first outline, in general, the legal framework that
66. David Rohde, Held by the Taliban: 7 Months, 10 Days in Captivity, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
18, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/18/world/asia/18hostage.html?pagewanted=all.
67. Infra Part IV; David Rohde, A Drone Strike and Dwindling Hope, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/21/world/asia/21hostage.htm.
68.

Infra Part IV.

69.

US

GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY

OFFICE,

GAO-12-536,

AGENCIES COULD IMPROVE

INFORMATION SHARING AND END-USE MONITORING ON UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE EXPORTS

9

(2012).
70. Gerry Doyle, Chinese Stealth Drone Makes FirstFlight, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 22, 2013),
http://sinosphere.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/11/22/chinese-stealth-drone-makes-first-flight/?_php

=true&_type=blogs&_r=0 (highlighting a 20 minute flight made by a "combat drone," but
commenting that "no weapon bays were visible"); Al Jazeera, Iran Unveils 'Biggest MissileEquipped Drone' (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/1 I/iran-

unveils-biggest-missile-equipped-drone-201311182223466932.html
(discussing claims by
Iranian military officials that the drone they now own can cover much of the Middle East,
including Israel, and can "carry air-to-surface rockets for combat operations," but acknowledging
that the claims cannot be independently verified).
71. Alston, supra note 18, at 444-45.
72. Jennifer Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Frameworkfor Detention and
Targeting Outside the "Hot" Conflict Zone, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 1165, 1174 (2013).
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surrounds RPA targeted killing operations, and it will also address the
International Law principles as they relate to the different landscapes in
which the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel are waging
armed conflicts against terrorist groups.
III. RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK

To begin an overview of the relevant international law issues
involving RPAs, this Part starts with jus ad bellum principles, or those
that deal with the lawfulness of the resort to force.73 Specifically for
purposes of this Article, jus ad bellum shapes when countries can resort
to RPAs to conduct targeted killing operations in another country's
sovereign territory. Jus ad bellum limits a State's resort to force in
another State's territory to instances where the other State gives its
consent or potentially when the other State is unable or unwilling to
effectively suppress the threat.74
For those States party to the U.N. Charter, including the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Israel, article 2(4) prohibits the use of force in
another country. 75 There are some exceptions to this rule. Consent by the
other State is one of those exceptions. More succinctly, when responding
to a terrorist threat that is resonating from another State's sovereign
territory, the responding State could enter that State's territory with its
consent.76
Additionally, under Article 51, States have the right of self-defense as
an exception to the general prohibition against the threat of or use of force
against another State. 77 The State's resort to self-defense in order to enter
the territory of another State must meet the demands of immediacy,
necessity, and proportionality. 78 Finally, as a third option, the U.N.
Security Council could pass a resolution authorizing the use of force in
another State's territory, essentially overriding the prohibition against the

73. SOLIS, supra note 6, at xxix.
74. Daskal, supra note 72, at 1181.
75. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
76. Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Study on
Targeted Killings, 37, U.N. Doc. AiHRC/14/24/Add. 6 (May 28, 2010) (by Phillip Alston)
[hereinafter Special Rapporteur Report (Alston)].
77. U.N. Charter, art. 51.
78. David Kretzmer, The Inherent Right to Self-Defence and Proportionalityin Jus Ad
Bellum, 24 EuR. J. INT'L L. 235, 242 (2013); see also U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure
World: Our Shared Responsibility: Rep. of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change, 188, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (noting that a threatened State, according to
long established international law, can take military action as long as the threatened attack is
imminent, no other means would deflect it and the action is proportionate).
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79
use of force from an outside State.
Jus in bello pertains to the law on the battlefield or, in this Article,
rules regulating the use of RPAs during armed conflict. 80 Thejus in bello
principles grew out of treaties regulating some of the very first battles,
such as the 1975 Treaty of Amity and Commerce between Prussian and
the United States. 81 Many of the IHL principles are encapsulated in the
Geneva Conventions and the Law of the Hague. 82 In addition to treaties,
the other main source of regulations placed on conduct on the battlefield
is custom. The entire body of treaty-based and customary international
law is referred to as the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), or International
Humanitarian Law (11L).83
States have different obligations in armed conflicts depending on the
status of each as a party or non-party to the Hague and the Geneva
Conventions.8 4 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) summed 85up these
two complex sets of laws in one of its 1996 Advisory Opinions.

[The] Hague Law and, more particularly, the Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, fixed the rights
and duties of belligerents in their conduct of operations and limited
the choice of methods and means of injuring the enemy in an
international armed conflict. . . . [T]he Geneva Law.. .which
protects the victims of war and aims to provide safeguards for
disabled armed forces personnel and persons not taking part in the
hostilities. These two branches of the law applicable in armed
conflict have become so closely interrelated that they are
considered to have gradually formed one single complex system,

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
the same
Cross).

U.N. Charter, arts. 40-42.
SoLIs, supra note 6, at xxix.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 23 (noting that LOAC and IHL, although technically different, essentially have
meaning, particularly among academics and the International Committee of the Red

84. For a complete listing of the Hague Conferences and Geneva Conventions, see Avalon
Project, Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, availableat http://avalon.law.yale.edu/
subject menus/lawwar.asp (last viewed Jan. 2, 2015). For a quick reference guide on which States
are parties to which Geneva Conventions, see ICRC Annual Report 2013, Volume I, at 610,
available at https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/annual-report/icrc-annual-report-2013.pdf
(2013); and, for a listing of which States are parties to which Hague Conventions, see ICRC
Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, availableat https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ih.nsf/
vwTreatiesByDate.xsp (last viewed Jan. 2, 2015). See also SOLIS, supra note 6, at 132 (noting
that nearly thirty years after the Additional Protocols were opened for ratification, the United

States has ratified neither).
85. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 66,
75, at 256 (internal quotations omitted).
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known today as international humanitarian law.
The United States is a party to the Hague Conferences of 1899 and
1907 (with some reservations), 86 the 1949 Geneva Conventions, and the
Geneva Conventions 2005 Additional Protocol III, but not Additional
Protocols I and 1I. 87 Additional Protocol I focuses the vast majority of its
Articles on international armed conflicts, 88 and Additional Protocol II
covers rules related to non-international armed conflicts. 89 Even under
the obligations of the Conventions to which the United States is a party,
many gaps remain in the laws related to armed conflict. The United States
thus looks to customary international rules to shape its operations,
including some provisions of Additional Protocols I and II, which it
considers to be customary international law. 90 Specific provisions are
discussed in further detail later in this Article.
Like the United States, Israel is a party to the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 2005 Additional Protocol III only (thus, not a party
to either Additional Protocol I or II).91 Still, Israel's obligations are
somewhat different than the United States. Although similar in party
status to the Geneva Conventions, Israel is conducting RPA targeted
killing operations in areas which it is considered to be the occupying
includes
power. 92 Convention IV of the 1949 Geneva Conventions
93
specific rules that place obligations on the occupying power.
The United Kingdom is party to many legal conventions that the
United States and Israel are not, and thus obligated to follow various rules
that the other two countries do not. For example, in addition to many of

86. For a complete listing of all the Hague Conventions, see ICRC Treaties and States
Parties to Such Treaties, available at https://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByDate.
xsp (last viewed Jan. 2, 2015).
87. See ICRC Annual Report 2013, supra note 84, at 610.
88. See 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949,
and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 5051, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I].
89. See Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 13, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 60 [hereinafter Additional Protocol It].
90. SOLIS, supra note 6, at 134 (discussing that in 1987, a high-ranking legal advisor at the
U.S. Department of State stated that of the 91 substantive Articles in Additional Protocol I, the
United States considers 59 to be customary international law; and in the early 1990s, the
Department of Defense affirmed that most of the Protocol I provisions are "binding on all" as a
"codification of the customary practice of nations").
91. See ICRC Annual Report 2013, supra note 84, at 610.
92. H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 18.
93. Geneva Convention III, infra note 96. The Hague IV Convention also includes rules
related to belligerent occupation, but Israel is only a party to Hague Convention I, Laws of War:
Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Oct. 18, 1907). See Avalon Project, supra note 84.
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the Hague Articles of 1898 and 1907 (with reservations), 94 the 1949
Geneva Conventions, and the 2005 Additional Protocol III, the United
Kingdom is9 5also a party to both of the Additional Geneva Protocols I and
II of 1977.

Whether the parties to the armed conflict are in an international armed
conflict or a non-international armed conflict is important because
different parts of the Geneva Conventions apply depending on which type
of armed conflict is being fought. More specifically, more protections
flow from the Conventions in the case of international armed conflicts
than non-international armed conflicts. 96 In accordance with the division
between Additional Protocols I and II related to international and noninternational armed conflicts, IHL is divided between those rules that
apply to international armed conflict and non-international armed
conflict. 97 International armed conflicts are those between states. Noninternational conflicts are "armed conflict[s] not of an international
character occurring in the territory" of a state. 98 These internal armed
conflicts
include "armed uprisings, sustained insurrections, [and] civil
99
wars."
In addition to jus ad bellum and jus in bello, RPA targeted killing
operations also implicate IHRL.1°° This is because IHRL is the legal
regime that applies outside of armed conflicts and controls civil
enforcement.' 0 As an example of the difference between IHL and IHRL,
IHRL limits the state's authority to kill in self-defense or immediate
defense of others, in other words, situations where an individual poses an
imminent risk of death or serious injury to herself or others.'0 2 Under
94. See ICRC Treaties and States Parties to Such Treaties, supra note 84.
95. See ICRC Annual Report 2013, supra note 84, at 610.
96. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded,
Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV].
97.

SOLIS, supra note 6, at 23.

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Some scholars argue that IHRL should always apply and other scholars debate whether
IHRL applies at all to operations against terrorists, even outside areas of armed conflict. This
Article addresses this debate in further detail below.
101. Alston, supra note 18, at 301-03 ("To the extent that IHL does not provide a rule, or
the rule is unclear and its meaning cannot be ascertained from the guidance offered by IHL
principles, it is appropriate to draw guidance from IHRL.") (citing multiple I.C.J. opinions).
102. Id.at 303-04; Carla Crandall, Ready... Fire... Aim! A CaseforApplying American
Due Process PrinciplesBefore Engaging in Drone Strikes, 24 FLA. J. INT'L L. 55, 66 (2012)
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IHRL, states are allowed to target and kill combatants or civilians who
are participating directly in hostilities.'0 3 Therefore, under IHIRL, the
04
authority to kill is not as broad as the authority under IHL.1
Additionally, IHRL requires higher standards of protecting civilians as
well as accounting for combatant and civilian casualties.
This Article addresses rules of IHRL and how they relate to RPA
targeted killing operations in further detail in subsequent Parts. To
preface that discussion, two other Conventions are of particular
significance to this Article. First, the International Convention on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR) is one of the leading Conventions in IHRL
and all three countries are parties to it. 10 5 Although also a party, the
United States does not believe that it has extraterritorial application, a
position that faces some scrutiny.' 0 6 Israel's position has similarly been
that the ICCPR does not apply to the individuals within the territories it
occupies because the individuals were not subject to Israel's
jurisdiction. 10 7 However, the ICJ disagrees and asserts that the ICCPR is
"applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its
10 8
jurisdiction outside its own territory."'
Second, the United Kingdom is also party to the European Convention
(noting that IHRL condemns the arbitrary deprivation of life and allows a State to use lethal force
against an individual "not in custody only if necessary to prevent him from posing a threat of
death of serious injury to others").
103. See Additional Protocol 1,supra note 88; Additional Protocol II, supra note 89.
104. Radsan & Murphy, supra note 4, at 1205.
105. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,
176.
106. Matthew Waxman, Head of U.S. Delegation, Principal Deputy Director of Policy
Planning, Dep't of State, Opening Statement to the U.N. Human Rights Committee (July 17,
2006), http://2001-2009.state.gov/s/p/rem/69126.htm ("[I1t is the long-standing view of the
United States that the Covenant by its very terms does not apply outside of the territory of a State
Party."); see also Beth Van Schaack, The United States' Position on the Extraterritorial
Application of Human Rights Obligations: Now is the Time for Change, Naval War College
International Law Studies Vol. 90-20 (2014) (discussing the history of the U.S. position that the
ICCPR, along with other Human Rights treaties, does not apply extraterritorially and ultimately
challenging the position); U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, The Judge Advocate
General's Legal Center and School, at 46-48 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. ARMY, OPERATION LAW

HANDBOOK] (discussing that the ICCPR is "expressly non-extraterritorial" in the context of
explaining how IHRL's "original focus" was only on persons living within the territory of the
United States and "not to any person with whom agents of the [the U.S.] government deal outside
of [U.S.] borders").
107. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 110-12 (July 9, 2004) [hereinafter I.C.J. Opinion]; see
also Orna Ben-Naftali & Yuval Shany, Living in Denial: The Application of Human Rights in the
OccupiedTerritories,37 ISR. L. REv. 17,26 (2003-04) ("Although [Israel] is a party to the leading
human rights treaties, consecutive Israeli governments have steadfastly objected to their
application in the Occupied Territories.")
108. I.C.J. Opinion, supra note 107, at 111.
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on Human Rights (ECHR). 1°9 While much of the language of the ECHR
is similar to that of the ICCPR, it includes some rights that are more
expansive than those in the ICCPR. Additionally, perhaps even more
significant for issues specific to RPA targeted killing operations, a full
body of law decided by the European Court of Human Rights that
obligates the United Kingdom in the field of IHRL beyond obligations on
the United States and Israel exists.

IV. APPLICATION OF JUSAD BELLUM
This Part focuses specifically on how the United States, United
Kingdom, and Israel apply the jus ad bellum principles to their RPA
targeted killing operations. Because the lawfulness of resorting to the use
of armed force applies differently to each country in which the United
States, the United Kingdom, and Israel are conducting RPA targeted
killing operations, this Part is further divided into subsections by location.
A. United States
1. Afghanistan and Iraq
On September 12, 2001, the U.N. Security Council unanimously
passed a resolution recognizing the U.S. right of self-defense to respond
to the terrorist acts of September 11 and calling on all U.N. Member
States to work together to bring terrorists to justice." 0 Thus, the Security
Council gave direct authorization for the United States to enter
Afghanistan and use force against terrorists there.
The situation in Iraq is different. Throughout the 1990s and early
2000s, the Security Council passed a number of resolutions related to
Iraq, including demanding Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and all Member
States to take all necessary means to uphold and implement the
109. Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights are the Members of the Council
of Europe, as stated in the Preamble of the Convention. Copy found at http://www.echr.coe.int/
Documents/ConventionENG.pdf, and Members of the Council are listed on the Council of
Europe's website, found at http://www.coe.int/en/web/portal/country-profiles. Of note, while the
United States is a member of the Organization of the American States, it has not ratified the
American Convention nor accepted jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.
Thus, at this time, any obligations that may be imposed on the United States by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights are not as fully developed as those of the European Court of Human
Rights on the United Kingdom, and they are not accepted as obligations by the U.S. government,
unlike the United Kingdom. For a complete listing of the Member States of the OAS, as well as
information about its structure, see http://www.oas.org/en/about/memberstates.asp (last visited
Jan. 2, 2015).
110. S.C. Res. 1368,
3-4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001).
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demand,"' and giving Iraq the "final opportunity" to disarm all its
biological and chemical weapons." 2 The United States attempted to get
a Security Council Resolution to specifically enter Iraq in the early 2000s,
but was unsuccessful." 3 The United States and coalition forces including
the United Kingdom, entered Iraq in March 2003 without a U.N. Security
Council Resolution due to the threat of weapons of mass destruction, as
well as the Iraqi government's continuous declination to follow the
demands of the Security Council and its numerous human rights
14
abuses. l
After the United States and coalition forces ousted Saddam Hussein
from power just two months later, the nature of the armed conflict there
changed. A new Iraqi government was appointed and the United States
and coalition forces remained there to assist the new government against
insurgents. 15 Thus, rather than an international armed conflict between
the United States and Iraq, the conflict became a non-international armed
conflict between al Qaeda terrorists and116the Iraqi government, assisted by
the United States and coalition forces.
Because the United States was engaged in armed conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan, the issues related to consent are different than in those
countries outside the zones of active hostilities. Regardless of whether
one takes the position that the initial U.S. entry into Iraq was lawful, once
the armed conflict became an internal non-international armed conflict
between the Iraqi government, with the assistance of the United States
and coalition forces, and terrorists, the question of the lawfulness of RPA
targeted killing operations from the jus ad bellum perspective was
different than for those countries where active hostilities are not ongoing.
In other words, since the United States was already in an ongoing conflict
there, engaging in active hostilities, the more important questions
surrounding RPA targeted killing operations relate tojus in bello rules.
2. Yemen
The U.S. RPA operations in Yemen provide an example of the lawful
use of force in another State based on that State's consent. 1 7 In May
2013, Attorney General Eric Holder specifically stated that RPA
111. S.C. Res. 678, 1-2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (Nov. 29, 1990).
112. S.C. Res. 1441, 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1441 (Nov. 8,2002).
113. See President Bush Meets with Prime Minister Blair, Remarks by the President and
Prime Minister, WHITEHOUSE.GOV (Jan. 31, 2003), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/
news/releases/2003/01/20030131-23.html [hereinafter Remarks by the President and Prime
Minister].
114. Id.
115. SOLIS, supra note 6, at 218-19.
116. Id. at219.
117. Blum & Heymann, supra note 11, at 150.
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operations in Yemen since 2009 were conducted with Yemeni consent. 18
Furthermore, the Yemeni Government acknowledged that the United
States sought prior consent for RPA strikes and would not conduct the
strike if Yemen objected." 9
However, that may be changing. The President of Yemen and the
Yemeni House of Representatives are seemingly in disagreement on
whether the strikes should continue.12 0 In December 2013, the Yemeni
House of Representatives passed a resolution requesting that RPA strikes
be prohibited. 2 ' The vote was nearly unanimous for the non-binding
resolution and was called a "strong warning to both the United States and
the government of Yemeni President" by a Yemeni government
official. 122 Despite the passage of the resolution, the United States
continues to conduct RPA targeted killing operations in Yemen, such as
which reportedly killed at least fifteen terrorists and
two in April 2014,
23
1
civilians.
three
3. Pakistan
Whether Pakistan consents to U.S. RPA operations there continues to
be the source of debate.' 24 On the one hand, Pakistani officials adamantly
deny any support for the U.S. use of RPAs in their country as "counterproductive, contrary to international law, a violation of Pakistan's
integrity," and they declare that they should
sovereignty and territorial
25
immediately.'
cease
On the other hand, in late 2013, classified documents were leaked to
the media evincing secret consent by Pakistani officials for years. 126 If
118. Holder Letter, supra note 30, at 3.
119. Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Third Report on the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, Human
Rights Council, 29, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/25/29 (Feb. 28, 2014) (by Ben Emmerson) [hereinafter
Emmerson Third Report to H.R. C.].
120. Hakim Almasmari, Drone Strikes Must End, Yemen's ParliamentSays, CNN.COM (Dec.
15, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/2013/12/15/world/meast/yemen-drones/.
121. Id.
122. Id. (internal citations omitted).
123. Peter Bergen, Obama'sHigh-Stakes Drone War in Yemen, CNN.COM (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/04/21 /opinion/bergen-yemen-obama-drone-war/index.html.
124. Id.
125. Ben Emmerson, Statement of the Special RapporteurFollowingMeetings in Pakistan,
U.N. Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner (Mar. 14,2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewslD=l 3146&LanglD=E.
126. Greg Miller & Bob Woodward, Secret Memos Reveal Explicit Nature of U.S., Pakistan
Agreement on Drones, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/

national-security/top-pakistani-leaders-secretly-backed-cia-drone-campaign-secret-documents-s
how/2013/10/23/15e6b0d8-3beb-I le3-b6a9-da62c264f40e_siory.html; see also McNeal, supra
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469

true, this revelation that Pakistani government officials consented to the
RPA strikes is a game-changer related tojus ad bellum because it means
the United States relied on consent for the operations, rather than the
"unable or unwilling" test discussed below. As further evidence of at least
some cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistan governments, in
February 2014, the United States curtailed RPA strikes at the request of
the Pakistani government while Pakistan engaged in peace talks
with the
128
Pakistani Taliban. 127 However, the strikes resumed in June.
Even in the absence of consent, the United States asserts that it can
legally carry out operations in countries such as Pakistan when they are
unable and unwilling to act. 129 The United States claims to be acting in
self-defense. Rather than wait for the threat to materialize into an attack
on the United States, the President is choosing to act anticipatorily under
the "unable or unwilling" test, based in customary international law. 130 In
other words, the United States claims the right to conduct RPA targeted
killing operations in other countries, regardless of the country's consent,
after concluding that "the relevant governmental authorities in the
country where the action is contemplated
cannot or will not effectively
3
address the threat to the U.S. persons." ' '
The "unable or unwilling" test is not a new legal basis for entering
another country's territory. 132 The United States first used the "unable or
unwilling" test against the Seminole Indians in Spanish Florida in 181733
1818, and again in 1836, against the Mexican Indian tribes in Mexico.1
The United States did not rely on the "unable or unwilling" test to justify
the use of force for over one hundred and fifty years, but has relied on it

note 19, at 697-98 (discussing the evidence that Pakistan has consented to the strikes in their
territory).
127. Karen DeYoung & Greg Miller, US. Said to CurtailDrone Strikes in Pakistan as
Officials There Seek Peace Talks with Taliban, WASH. POST (Feb, 4, 2014), http://

www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-curtails-drone-strikes-in-pakistan-as-offici
als-there-seek-peace-talks-with-taliban/2014/02/04/ld63f52a-8dd8-11 e3-833c-33098f9e5267_p

rint.html.
128. See NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, supra note 19; Ismail Khan & Declan Walsh, Missile
Strike by C.I.A. Drone Kills at Least 4, Pakistan Reports, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2014,

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/12/world/asia/missile-strike-by-cia-drone-kills-at-least-4-paki
stan-reports.html?_r=0.
129.

Ashley S. Deeks, "Unwilling or Unable": Toward a Normative Frameworkfor

ExtraterritorialSelf-Defense, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 483, 485-86 (2012).
130. For an in-depth look at the history of the "unwilling or unable" doctrine, see id. at 483.
131. White House Press Release, Fact Sheet: U.S. Policy Standards and Procedures for the
Use of Force in Counterterrorism Operations Outside the United States and Areas of Active
Hostilities, at 2 (May 23, 2013), http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/ppg-fs.pdf [hereinafter White
House Fact Sheet].
132. See Deeks, supra note 129, app. A.
133. Id.
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Specifically, according to one

scholar, the United States used the "unable or unwilling" test as
justification for taking action in other countries at least nine times, many
of these actions taking place since 1998.135
Publicly, in the absence of Pakistani government officials admitting
consent, the United States is relying heavily on the "unable or unwilling"
doctrine to justify its actions in Pakistan. 136 The U.S. position is that
terrorists who are actively planning future operations against American
civilians cannot be allowed to hide within countries that lack the security
and infrastructure to address the threat. 137 Thus, the United States will

make a determination whether the other state is unable or unwilling 1to
38
"deal effectively" with the threat before ordering the RPA operation.
If the state cannot, then the United States argues it is legally authorized
to eliminate the threat itself. 139 In this way, some argue, "[a]ctive selfdefense (in the form of targeted killing), if properly executed, not only
enables the State to more effectively protect itself within a legal context
but also leads to minimizing the loss of innocent civilians caught between
international law by using innocents
the terrorists (who regularly violate
140
as human shields) and the State.,
A Department of Justice (DOJ) White Paper, leaked to the media in

February 2013, gives a little further guidance regarding factors
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. President Obama Speech, supra note 1 (insisting that the United States will "act against
terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the American people and when there are
no other governments capable of effectively addressing the threat"); McNeal, supra note 19, at
695-98 (noting that the U.S. reliance upon the "unable or unwilling" test has been controversial).
137. President Obama Speech, supra note 1 (asserting the United States will respond when
"foreign governments cannot or will not effectively stop terrorism in their territory[.]").
138. Holder, supra note 29; see also Koh, supra note 28 ("whether a particular individual
will be targeted in a particular location will depend upon considerations specific to each case,
including .. the willingness and ability of those states to suppress the threat the target poses");
Department of Justice, Lawfulness of a Lethal Operation Directed Against a U.S. Citizen Who is
a Senior Operational Leader of al-Qa'ida or an Associated Force, White Paper, at 1-2,
http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_WhitePaper.pdf [hereinafter
DOJ White Paper] (Feb. 4, 2013).
[A] lethal operation in a foreign nation would be consistent with international
legal principles of sovereignty and neutrality if it were conducted ... with the
consent of the host nation's government or after a determination that the host
nation is unable or unwilling to suppress the threat posed by the individual target.
Id.
139. Holder, supra note 29.
140. Guiora, supra note 6, at 324. See also Deeks, supra note 129, at 503 ("that the test
migrated into the world of non-state actors is not surprising, because the equities of the affected
states are similar in each scenario").
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considered when deciding whether the United States can enter a state
unable or unwilling to act in order to counter a terrorist threat. 141 The DOJ
advised that an RPA operation targeting the enemy can be conducted as
part of the ongoing armed conflict, even if the enemy moves its base from
one country to another. 42 Whether the armed conflict is ongoing is a
determination based on the particular facts and circumstances in each
case. 143 Thus, the fact "that transnational non-state organizations such as
al-Qa'ida may have no single site serving as their base of operations"
weighs in favor of an RPA operation if it "were to occur in a location
where al-Qa'ida or an associated force has a significant and organized
presence and from which al-Qa'ida or an associated force, including its
senior operational leaders, plan attacks against U.S. persons and
interests."' 44 But, it should be conducted only after a determination that
the individual poses an imminent threat of attack, capture is infeasible,
the operation would be conducted in a manner consistent with the laws
of war, and "after a determination that the host nation is unable
or
1 45
unwilling to suppress the threat posed by the individual targeted."'
4. African Countries
All indications are that the RPA operations thus far conducted in
African countries have been done with the consent of the relevant country
involved. 146 The exception to this may be in Somalia, where it is unclear
if the United States is acting with the consent of the Somalian government
against al Shabaab and al Qaeda terrorists,47 or whether the United States
is relying on the unable or unwilling test.1
B. UnitedKingdom
1. Afghanistan and Iraq
The issue of consent for RPA operations in Iraq and Afghanistan is
different than for other countries outside the zones of hostilities. Since
the United Kingdom was involved in an armed conflict as a coalition
partner to the United States and others, against terrorists in Iraq and
141. DOJ White Paper, supra note 138, at 1-2.
142. Id at 4.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 4-5.
145.

Id. at 1, 5.

146. See Harris & Hirsch, supra note 34.
147. See Bureau of Investigative Journalism, http://www.thebureau investigates.com/2012/
02/22/get-the-data-somalias-hidden-war/ (giving a detailed description of the history of suspected
RPA strikes in Somalia and discussions about them from U.S., U.K., and Somalia government
officials).
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Afghanistan, the legal questions related to RPA targeted killing
48
operations become jus in bello questions, rather thanjus ad bellum.1
2. Libya
In Libya, the United Kingdom and United States, as members of
NATO, were operating pursuant to a U.N. Security Council Resolution
authorizing Member States to "take all necessary measures" to protect
civilians there against threat of attack. 149 Therefore, the two countries
acted with the authorization of the Security Council and did not need to
rely on anotherjus ad bellum principle for use of force there.
3. The Unable or Unwilling Test?
Although the United Kingdom has not conducted RPA targeted killing
operations in other countries outside of active hostilities, the United
Kingdom has historically relied on the "unable or unwilling" test being
used by the United States. Perhaps the most well-known use of the unable
or unwilling test was in 1837 when the United Kingdom used the test to
justify action in the United States against U.S. citizens who sympathized
with Canadian rebels.' 50 The U.S. citizens used the Caroline,a private
merchant ship, to provide arms and supplies to the Canadian rebels. 15 1 A
British raiding party crossed the Niagara River into New York, where the
ship was moored, set the ship
on fire, and sent it over the falls, killing two
152
Americans in the process.

The United States contested the U.K. actions. 153 Former Secretary of
State Daniel Webster argued that the U.K. acts did not constitute selfdefense, which he said should be limited to situations where there is an
actual threat, one so "instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means [or] moment of deliberation," the response must be essential and
proportional, and all peaceful means of resolving the dispute have been
exhausted. 54 Thus, Secretary of State Webster identified the essential
elements of the 5"unable
or unwilling" test-immediacy, necessity, and
5
proportionality. 1
The United Kingdom has relied on the "unable or unwilling" test five
148. See Remarks by the President and Prime Minister, supra note 113, at 1-3 (providing
evidence of the United States and the United Kingdom working together to fight terrorism.
149. S.C. Res. 1973, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1973 (Mar. 17, 2011).
150. Deeks, supra note 129, at 549.
151. JAMES BAKER, IN THE COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS
TIMES 197 (2007).
152. Id.
153. Deeks, supra note 129, at 501-02; BAKER, supra note 151, at 140.
154. BAKER, supra note 151, at 197; Guiora, supranote 6, at 323.
155. BAKER, supra note 151, at 197.
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times to justify the lethal use of force in other countries. 156 All of these
uses, however, were before 1940.157 Thus, the United Kingdom has not
used the "unable or unwilling" doctrine to justify action in another
country since Article 51 of the U.N. Charter was ratified.
Even so, the "unable or unwilling" test is part of the current U.K.
military manual on the Laws of Armed Conflict. 158 It provides that:
Neutral states must refrain from allowing their territory to be used
by belligerent states for the purposes of military operations. If a
neutral state is unable or unwilling to prevent the use of its territory
for the purposes of such military operations, a belligerent state may
become entitled to use force in self-defence against enemy forces
operating from the territory of that neutral state. Whether or not
they are 59
so entitled will depend on the ordinary rules of thejus ad
1
bellum.
C. Israel
1. Gaza Strip, Judea, Samaria
Israel operates in the Gaza strip to counter terrorist threats there based
a claim of individual self-defense.' 60 The Israeli High Court of Justice
confirmed that the State is acting in self-defense stating that "the State of
Israel is under a constant, continual, and murderous wave of terrorist
attacks, directed at Israelis . . . without any discrimination between
61
combatants and civilians or between men, women, and children."'
Recalling the events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, the
Court notes that the international community and international
organizations have defined such162terrorist acts as "armed conflict
justifying the use of counterforce."'
156.

Decks, supra note 129, app. A.

157.

Id.

158.

See THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, JOINT SERVICE

1.43a (2004) [hereinafter U.K. LOAC Manual], https://www.gov.uk/
PUBLICATION 383,
govemment/uploads/system/uploads/attachmentdata/file/27874/JSP3832004Edition.pdf
[hereinafter J.S.P. 383].
159. Id.
160. H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 1; State of Israel, Operation in Gaza, 27 December
2008 - 18 January 2009: Factualand Legal Aspects 3 (July 2009), http://www.mfa.gov.il/
[hereinafter
MFAGraphics/MFA%20Gallery[Documents/GazaOperation%20w%20Links.pdf
Operationin Gaza] (in justifying military action in Gaza in December 2008-January 2009, noting
that "Israel has both a right and an obligation to take military action against Hamas in Gaza to
stop Hamas' almost incessant rocket and mortar attacks upon thousands of Israeli civilians and its
other acts of terrorism").
161. H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 16 (internal citations omitted).
162. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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Israel conducts the targeted killing as a necessary condition to saving
lives, and only when no other alternative exists. 163 Although the ICJ
rejects Israel's right to claim self-defense in the territories it occupies, the
Court recognized Israel's right to act against the "numerous
indiscriminate and deadly acts of violence against its civilian
population."' 164 The ICJ further states that
it is not only Israel's right, but
165
citizens.
its
of
life
the
protect
to
its duty
2. The Unable or Unwilling Test?
Israel has used the unable or willing test to justify use of force in other
countries, though not as often as the United States.' 6 6 Specifically, Israel
has invoked the doctrine to justify the use of force in another country five
times, from 1978 through 2006.167 The 2006 operations
took place in the
68
southern part of Lebanon against Hezbollah.1
In July 2006, Hezbollah sent militants across the southern border of
Lebanon into Israel, who then ambushed Israeli soldiers, killing three and
kidnapping two others. 169 Israel promised to retaliate and fired rockets
and sent ground troops into Lebanon. 170 The government also pressured
Lebanon to reign in and disarm Hezbollah, but because Lebanon has
"always failed" to do so, Israel decided to respond on its own and crossed
into the territory of Lebanon. 171
D. Comparingthe Countries: The Unable or Unwilling Test
The first major point from the preceding paragraphs to be gleaned
from comparing the countries is that, while the United States may be
relying on the "unable and unwilling" test more frequently than the
United Kingdom or Israel, it is not alone in doing so to respond to terrorist
attacks originating in another country. 172 All three countries studied have
historically relied on the test, and Israel as recently as 2006 in its armed

163.
164.

Id. 13.
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 1.C.J. 136,

141 (July 9).

165.

Id.

166.
167.

Deeks, supra note 129, app. A.l.
Id.

168.

Id.at 486.

169.

Martin Fletcher, Regional Tensions FuelLebanon-IsraelClashes, NBC NEWS (July 12,

2006), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/13827858/ns/worldnews-mideastn-africa/t/regional-tensi
ons-fuel-lebanon-israel-clashes/#.U 1VAnyDD9jo.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Deeks, supra note 129, app. 1.
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conflict against Hezbollah. 7 3 The factors relied upon by both the United
States and Israel to invoke the principle as a legal basis for entering
another country are very similar-an ongoing armed conflict exists, one
that involves constant, continual, and fatal terrorist attacks, it poses
imminent threats to the country's citizens, there is no other alternative
other than a targeted killing (in other words, capture is infeasible), and
the nation 7hosting
the terrorist threat is unable or unwilling to suppress
4
1
threat.
the
The second major point is that despite the fact that all three countries
have relied on the test, the United States is the biggest user.175 The United
Kingdom has not relied on the principle since the U.N. Charter came into
being to govern state relations. 76 Thus, it is hard to know whether the
United Kingdom no longer believes the test has any force as a legal
justification for the use of force in another country. On the other hand, it
is still a part of the U.K. military manual on LOAC, which indicates at
least that the U.K. MOD does not want to foreclose the possibility that it
may use it in the future. 177 While Israel used it to justify operations in
Lebanon against Hezbollah, Israel has not conducted operations in as
many other countries or as far away from its own borders as the United
States. 178
At the very least, the test has a historical basis in all three countries,
and has been used recently by the United States and Israel. 179 While no
set of list of factors have been established to determine when a state can
use the test,1 80 the factors used by the United States and Israel to invoke
the test, listed above, are very similar. 181 However, the pressing question
that remains is what it means to determine that a state is "unable or
unwilling" to act. The inability to act could be based on a whole host of
factors, including a lack of resources or the lack of political will. If the
third-party is specifically providing a safe haven to or otherwise aiding
the non-state actors, then the ability to respond in that state's territory is
more easily justified than if the third-party state is simply not responding
to the threat. Another possibility is that the State wants to combat the
threat, is claiming that it82 has the ability to combat the threat, but is
actually unable to do so.'
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 141-45 & 160-65.
Deeks, supra note 129, app. I.
Id.
Id. at 500.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id. app. I.
Id.
Id. at 506.
Id. at 505.
Id.
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Based on jurisprudence from the ICJ, 83 some argue that states can
only rely on the "unwilling or unable" test to justify actions in third-party
states for acts by non-state actors if the acts of the non-state actors are
actually imputable to the state.' 84 Special Rapporteur Alston argued that
the "reality is that it will only be in very rare circumstances that a nonstate actor whose activities do not engage the responsibility of any state
will be able to conduct the kind of armed attack that would give rise to
the right to use extraterritorial185force," and thus, Security Council approval
should be sought each time.
Since the establishment of the U.N. Security Council, approval should
be the default position every time that a state wants to use force in another
state. 186 But that seemingly straight-forward requirement does not
necessarily contradict the legality of the "unable or unwilling" test. 187 It
does not equate getting Security Council approval for the use of force in
a particular country or against a particular terrorist group with getting
Security Council approval for every operation in that country or against
that group. In an armed conflict, that would be impracticable. If terrorists
find safe haven simply because they cross over from Afghanistan to
Pakistan or Israel to Lebanon, allowing them to conduct or complete an
attack that kills innocent civilians, it surely cannot be that a country must
pause its operation to get Security Council approval to respond.
One key factor to determining when a state must get Security Council
approval may be the imminence of the threat from the non-state actor.
And, "[t]here is evidence that in drawing up the Charter many states
assumed that the inherent right to self-defence includes the right to use
force against an imminent attack if the conditions of the Carolinetest are
met, namely that a state is faced with the threat of an armed attack which
presents a necessity of self-defense, instant, overwhelming, leaving no
choice of means and no moment of deliberation."' 88 In other words, the
legality of the responding State interfering with the third-party state's
sovereignty diminishes as the imminence of the threat from the non-state
actor diminishes. 189 This factor would have to be determined on a case183.

See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian

Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136,

139 (July 9) (determining that Article 51 did not

apply to Israel's self-defense claim because Israel does not claim that the acts were not imputable
to a foreign state).
184. Special Rapporteur Report (Emmerson), supra note 38,
55; Special Rapporteur
Report (Alston), supra note 76, 40.
185. Special Rapporteur Report (Alston), supra note 76, 40.
186. Kretzmer, supra note 78, at 247-48.
187. Id. at 248.
188.

Id.

189.

Id.at 182.
The need to use lethal force in order to prevent that violence might be immediate,
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by-case basis, dependent on the non-state90 actor and the most current
intelligence regarding his latest activities.'
States should not have to sit by and wait for attack before they can
respond in the face of a third-party state that is unable to combat the
terrorist threat itself. As an example, the acts conducted against Israel in
2006 were from terrorists located in Lebanon. The government of
Lebanon has been unable to stop the terrorist threat within its borders
9
from attacking Israel and kidnapping some of its military members.' '
Because the terrorists entered the territory of Israel, Israel responding by
following them across the border back into Lebanon to counter any
further attack, where Lebanon is unable to respond to the threat itself, is
an example ofjustifiable lawful self-defense.
The situation in Israel in 2006 is a bit different than the RPA targeted
killing operations by the United States in Pakistan which are done not in
response to an attack, but in anticipation of an imminent threat. Again,
the key may be the application of the principles of imminence of the threat
of attack, necessity to respond to the attack, and proportionality in
response. Of course, the situation in Pakistan is further complicated by
the question of whether Pakistan is consenting to the U.S. operations
there. If the state is giving its consent, surely the state with the ability to
respond to the imminent threat should not be forced to wait on Security
Council approval to act on the basis of that consent.
Even without Pakistani consent, United States consistently asserts that
it must conduct these operations to stop an imminent attack against the
United States from a significant threat, an individual that cannot be
captured, and must be killed to be stopped. Assuming the intelligence
gathered by the United States on particular individuals proves that this is
true, the necessity principle is likely satisfied. Additionally, assuming it
is true that the individual cannot be captured and is planning an imminent
attack on the United States, then perhaps proportionality is satisfied as
well. If the President, in deciding to target and kill an individual is saving
the lives of tens or hundreds of Americans, then the strike on that one
individual is proportional.
The imminence principle is harder to satisfy. Research indicates that
U.S. government officials engage in a lengthy evaluation process before
92
making the determination that a particular individual must be targeted. 1
since if such force is not used now it may not be possible to prevent the violence
later. This may be what has been termed the last window of opportunity to
frustrate further terrorist attacks.
Id.
190.
191.
192.

Id.
Id.
McNeal, supra note 19, at 702 (describing in detail the process for determining who
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This indicates that the United States is applying a much broader
interpretation of imminence to RPA targeted killing operations than that
implied by the doctrine articulated by Secretary Webster in response to
the Caroline incident. 193 Secretary Webster said the attack must be so
instant and overwhelming, as to leave "no choice of means and no
moment of deliberation."'' 94 The nature of RPA operations is so different
than an attack on a moored merchant vessel that perhaps Secretary
Webster's description of imminence does not really apply to RPA
operations. What RPA operations do provide is a much greater amount
of information, through surveillance and intelligence-gathering, than
what military operators had in the days of the Caroline incident.,9 5 They
also provide the ability to abort the strike up until right before it
happens. 196 But, it is still unclear what "imminence" really means from
the position of the U.S. government.
Despite the unsettled nature of the definition of "imminence" as part
of the "unwilling or unable" test, the nature of conflict against terrorists
supports its use. 19 7 Particularly in those states where terrorists can find
safe harbor, where terrorists can hide in regions unreachable by law
enforcement, where the state's own enforcement mechanisms are unable
to suppress the threat due to the lack of manpower and resources, this
principle is vital to the self-defense of the respondent state.1 98 "The fact
that the 'unwilling or unable' test finds its roots in neutrality law anchors
the test's legitimacy - even in the test's current skeletal form and, in 1so
99
doing, may enhance what Franck terms its 'compliance pull.""
Furthermore, advancements in technology make the "unable and willing"
test apply in ways that were previously unavailable.
Therefore, despite the ICJ's decision and the United Kingdom's nonuse of the doctrine since 1940, the United States, Israel, and other states
will likely continue to use the "unable or unwilling" justification. But,
they should do so with constraint applied by factors that should be
considered each and every time before use of the RPA to target the
terrorist threat, including imminence, necessity, and proportionality.
will be added to the "kill list," how that person is found, tracked, and targeted).
193. Id.
194. Kretzmer, supra note 78, at 247-48.
195. Compare McNeal, supra note 19, at 702 (describing the detail process for RPA targeted
killing operations), with Kretzmer, supra note 78, at 248 (stating the Caroline test is met when an
attack is overwhelming and leaving "no choice of means and no moment of deliberation.").
196. See McNeal, supra note 19, at 704.
197. See generally Deeks, supra note 129.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 497; Kenneth Anderson, Stop Presses: "Even Eric PosnerSays DroneStrikes in
Pakistan areIllegal," LAWFARE (Oct. 9, 2012), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/1 0/stop-presse
s-even-eric-posner-says-drone-strikes-in-Pakistan-are-illegal/#.UvjpyAo5jo
(discussing the
longstanding U.S. position that the "unwilling or unable" test can be used in self-defense).
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This last point requires further emphasis. Accepting the "unable or
unwilling" test as a justification for states to overcome the limitations of
sovereignty when that state wants to eliminate a threat emanating from
another country merely addresses one part of the question of whether a
state can use force in that country. More specifically, the "unable or
unwilling" test gives rise to a right to self-defense for the United States
to enter Pakistan, for example, to address a threat of a terrorist attack
against it that the Government of Pakistan is unable or unwilling to
address. However, in accordance with the Caroline test, decision-makers
within the United States must look not only to the imminence of the
attack, but also the necessity and proportionality of responding with an
RPA targeted killing operation before making the decision to respond
with force in Pakistan's sovereign. These two principles-necessity and
proportionality-are rooted in IHL and discussed in further detail in the
next Part.
V. Jus IN BELLO AND FILLING THE GAPS WITH IHRL

A. IHL or IHRL?
In addition to debates about the application ofjus ad bellum, another
set of legal criticisms of the use of RPAs in targeted killings concernsjus
in bello principles, including which regime, IHL or IHRL applies, and the
extent to which human rights law should fill any gaps in IHL.2 °° IHL is
divided between those rules that apply to international armed conflict and
non-international armed conflict." °1 The plain language of the Geneva
Conventions indicates that those provisions that apply to international
armed conflicts do not apply to armed conflicts with terrorist groups, who
are not parties to the Conventions.
Furthermore, the rules related to non-international armed conflicts
arguably do not apply when fighting against terrorists because global
fights against terrorism do not easily qualify as uprisings, insurrections,

200. Not surprisingly, scholars come down on all sides of the debate. Compare Radsan &
Murphy, supra note 4, at 1205, 1208 (determining that IHL should apply because it controls
killing in armed conflict and grants broad authority to kill combatants and civilians taking direct
part in hostilities), with Kretzmer, supra note 78, at 189 (because both Common Article 3 of the
GC and Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II to the GC relate to conflicts occurring within the
territory of a state party, "this would seem to imply that the rules and principles regarding noninternational conflicts are reserved for internal domestic armed conflicts, and do not apply to a
conflict between a state and a terrorist group acting from outside its territory"), and Crandall,
supra note 102, at 71 (determining that RPA strikes are unlawful because terrorists qualify neither
as combatants or civilians taking direct part in hostilities).
201. See Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols, supra notes 88, 89 & 96.
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and civil wars that occur in the territory of a State.2 °2 Thus, the first major
question is whether a State's seemingly global war against terrorists
qualifies as a non-international armed conflict so that 1HL applies to the
conflict, even outside the zones of active hostilities. 20 3 Because IHRL
applies outside of armed conflicts, the next question is whether IHRL
should govern RPA targeted killing operations, especially in those
countries outside of the declared armed conflicts of Iraq and Afghanistan.
Further, if the answer is yes, to what extent it should apply. On the other
hand, if IHL still applies to global fights against terrorists, no matter
where they are physically located, then should IHRL fill the gaps left by
the rules of 1HL and to what extent. This Article will now compare and
contrast the ways in which the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel
answer the questions related to labeling the conflict with armed terrorist
groups (international or non-international), and whether IHL or IHRL
applies.
1. United States
The U.S. Supreme Court has determined the conflict with al Qaeda
should be treated as a non-international armed conflict for purposes of
IHL.20 4 Although specifically declining to decide whether the conflict
with al Qaeda is one to which the full protections afforded under the
Geneva Conventions apply, the justices stated that "there is at least one
provision of the Geneva Conventions that applies here even if the relevant
conflict is not one between signatories [to the Conventions]., 20 5 That
provision is Common Article 3, which appears in all four Geneva
Conventions and binds all parties to the conflict to certain provisions
protecting persons who are no longer taking part in the hostilities,
including individuals who have been detained.20 6
The justices note, based on the commentaries to the Geneva
Conventions, that the widest scope possible should be given to the
question of whether Common Article 3 applies to an armed conflict that
is occurring within the territory of a signatory party rather than between
parties because the purpose of the provision is to provide at least minimal
202. See supra text accompanying notes 96-99.
203. It cannot be assumed that the Geneva and Hague Conventions apply to the war with
terrorist groups. In fact, in early 2002, under the Bush administration, the U.S. position was that
the Conventions did not apply at all to the armed conflict with al Qaeda, the Taliban, and
associated forces and that those combatants should be afforded no protections under the
Conventions. Charles Babington & Michael Abramowitz, U.S. Shifts Policy on Geneva
Conventions, WASH. POST (July 12, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content
article/2006/07/! 1/AR2006071100094.html.

204.
205.
206.

Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629-30 (2006).
Id.
Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 96, art. 3.
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protections to the parties to the conflict. 20 7 Those minimal protections
include the obligation to treat combatants on the other side of the armed
conflict humanely, meaning no cruel treatment or torture, hostage-taking,
or humiliating and degrading treatment, among other things. 20 8 Thus, the
Geneva Convention rules that apply to shape the conduct of the United
States in armed conflicts between the United States and terrorist groups
are limited. The Supreme Court did not answer the question of whether
IL or IHRL would apply outside the zones of active hostilities, but for
the United States conducting operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, the
basic principles of IHL apply.
Professor Phillip Alston posits that both 1HL and IHRL apply in the
context of any armed conflict and "whether a particular killing is legal is
determined by the applicable lex specialis.,,2 09 Therefore, in an armed
conflict, IHL applies to the extent that it answers questions about the
legality of certain acts, but when its rules do not, then IHRL can provide
guiding principles. 210 Outside armed conflicts, Alton posits that IHRL is
the lex specialis.2 1'
An argument against Alston's position is that, in the context of
terrorism threats around the world, applying IHRL to individual terrorists
who happen to fall outside the zone of active hostilities may not make
sense in application. As an example, at a meeting held by the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in January 2012, experts were asked
about the specific case of an individual member of a non-state organized
armed group, that is party to a non-international armed conflict, and who
was at home sleeping with his family when the state party found him and
wanted to carry out an RPA targeted killing operation against him. 21 2 A
small majority determined that IHL applies to this situation as the lex
specialis, outside of active hostilities, based on the individual'sstatus or
function because "treaty and customary IHL allow the targeting of
207. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 631.
208. Geneva Conventions I-IV, supra note 96, art. 3; see also SOLIS, supra note 6, at 98
(noting that while "humane treatment" is not defined directly, examples incompatible actions are
provided as illustrations and such treatment will vary according to the circumstances).
209. Alston, supra note 18, at 301.
210. See also H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 18 ("[H]umanitarian law is the lex specialis
which applies in the case of an armed conflict. When there is a gap (lacuna) in that law, it can be
supplemented by human rights law" (citing multiple sources)); Kretzmer, supra note 78, at 185
("The prevailing theory is that even in the conduct of hostilities, the IHRL regime applies,
although in part it is superseded by the lex specialis, IHL. This theory was adopted by the IC in
the Nuclear Weapons case.").
211. Alston, supra note 18, at 301.
212. Expert Meeting, International Committee of the Red Cross, Expert Meeting: The Use
of Force in Armed Conflicts: Interplay Between the Conduct of Hostilities and Law Enforcement
Paradigms, 19-23 (Jan. 2012), http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4171.
pdf [hereinafter ICRC Expert Meeting].
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members of armed forces and fighters as well as civilians directly
participating in hostilities in armed conflict situations and provide for
detailed and specific rules in this regard., 213 Thus, the sleeping fighter
could be attacked so long as the IHL principles are fulfilled.2 14
Furthermore,
according to the ICRC, state practice is consistent with this
215
analysis.
2. United Kingdom
Thus far, the United Kingdom has likely only used RPAs in areas of
active hostilities, where IHL more clearly applies. 216 Even so, critics
claim the United Kingdom is violating the basic principles of IHL,
including proportionality, distinction, and humanity, which is discussed
in detail below. 217 Even assuming arguendo that the United Kingdom
meets the requirements of the basic principles of IHL, meeting IHL
obligations may not be all that is required of that state. The United
Kingdom is a party to additional conventions that impose obligations
under IHRL that do not apply to operations by the United States or Israel.
This includes Geneva Conventions Additional Protocol I and II of 1977,
and the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, the U.K.
position that the ICCPR applies extraterritorially means it must meet its
additional IHRL obligations.
3. Israel
For Israel, the Israeli High Court of Justice held their armed conflict
213. Id. at 19-20.
214. Id. at 19.
215. Id. However, a minority Of experts took an opposing view, determining that the fact
that the individual is not conducting hostilities at that moment, because he is sleeping with his
family, and is isolated, thus rendering capture feasible, means that the IHRL regime should apply.
Id. at 20. Those who espoused the minority view acknowledged that IHL would instead apply if
the individual was sleeping in an encampment of insurgents, if he was directly participating in
hostilities, or if he were an individual in the context of an international armed conflict. Id at 20.
216. Shiner & Carey, supra note 23, at 3 (noting that there is no public information to
suggest that the United Kingdom has yet used drones outside of zones of armed conflict). Still,
similar to some within the United States, certain groups within the United Kingdom are concerned
with the current U.K. use of RPAs, including aid to the United States. See, e.g., Cole, supra note
23, at 5-6 (noting the lack of clarity about when and how terrorists can be targeted combined with
the secrecy surrounding the exact U.K. Rules of Engagement as "troubling" and calling on MOD
officials to both confirm or deny whether it has carried out targeted killings in Afghanistan, and
to make clear to the United States that any intelligence provided by the United Kingdom must be
in accordance with international law norms.
217. Shiner & Carey, supra note 23, at 4 (claiming a "strong possibility that the UK has
misdirected itself as to the requirements of the IHL principles of proportionality, distinction and
humanity and as to its human rights obligation to protect human life and to investigate all deaths
(civilians and combatants alike) arguably caused in breach of that obligation").
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with terrorist organizations that target their citizens is an international
armed conflict. 21 8 The judges based their holding on the principle that
armed conflict that occurs between an occupying power and rebel or
insurgent group amounts to an international armed conflict. 219 However,
that principle is "not restricted only to" those armed conflicts in the area
itself, but also to an armed conflict that "crosses the borders of the statewhether or not the place in which the armed conflict occurs is subject to
belligerent occupation." 220 Thus, IL with all its protective provisions
apply to the Israeli armed conflict with Hamas, Hezbollah and other
terrorist groups. The Court emphasized that though IHL is the lex
specialis which applies in the case of an armed conflict, "[w]hen there is
a gap (lacuna)
in that law, it can be supplemented by human rights
22 1
law."
4. Comparing the Countries
In this overview of the issues surrounding the question of whether IHL
or IHRL applies to conflicts with terrorists, it may appear that the United
States is applying less stringent standards when conducting RPA targeted
killing operations than the United Kingdom and Israel because of the
determination that the armed conflict with terrorists is a non-international
armed conflict. Specifically, it may seem that the United States is less
stringent in applying IHL than the United Kingdom which has not
conducted RPA targeted killing operations outside those areas of active
hostilities, 222 and Israel which labels its conflict with terrorists as an
international armed conflict, thus applying all of the Geneva Conventions
to the conflict. 223 Furthermore, while scholars and experts in the United
States are still debating the issue of whether (and how much of) IHRL
applies to RPA targeted killing operations in those areas outside of active
hostilities, the Israel High Court determined that IHRL will supplement
IHL in all
operations against Hamas, Hezbollah, and other terrorist
224
groups.

The analysis cannot end there, though, because the different situations
in which each country finds itself shape the answer to whether IHRL
applies to the territories in which they are conducting RPA targeted
killings. Because Israel is operating as an occupying power in an
occupied territory, it has heightened obligations under the Geneva
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 18.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See Jewish Virtual Library, infra note 247.
See generally supra note 51.
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Conventions regarding treatment of non-combatants within the occupied
territory. 225 These heightened obligations include a litany of what could
be considered to be policing powers, such as enforcing penal laws already
in place in the occupied territory, 226 only enacting new laws if necessary
to "maintain the orderly government of the territory, and to ensure the
security" of its armed forces, 227 following specific restraints on
imposition of the death penalty, 228 providing for the care of "protected
problems, 229
persons," including women, minors, and those with medical
230
and affording due process rights to accused persons.
From these examples, it is clear that some of the policing powers
allowed under IHL are contradictory to the freedoms guarantee under
IHRL. On the one hand, some of these actions permitted by the law of
occupation would be prohibited under IHRL as impeding human
rights. 231' These include, for example, restrictions on political activity,
freedom of movement, and freedom of expression. 232 This is because,
while occupying powers are required to afford certain protections to the
non-enemy populations within the occupied territory, the occupying
power is allowed to take those actions that 233
protect its own forces based
on security and imperative military reasons.
On the other hand, other 1IHRL rules necessary to fulfill and protect
human rights would require the occupying power to undertake
fundamental changes to occupied territory that are actually prohibited by
the law of occupation. 234 This is because "[p]rotection of human rights
requires persistent and intrusive intervention in daily life in and,
oftentimes, expansive changes to, the political and economic systems of
occupied territory." 235 But, the law of occupation allows for limited
interference in the daily life of the civilian population within the occupied
territory for reasons such as to ensure maintenance of current medical,
educational, religious, and governmental services are available, but only
225. H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 18. See also Grant Harris, Forty Years After 1967:
Reappraisingthe Role andLimits of the Legal Discourseon Occupation in the Israeli-Palestinian

Context, 41 ISR. L. REV. 87, 100 (2008) (noting that because Israel has now "largely acceded to
the application of occupation law" and the international community's position on the issue is also
clear, "Israel may be scrutinized and judged in terms of its conformity with the law of occupation
and, unlike most other occupants, may not escape the contradictory pull of human rights law and
the law of occupation... by simply casting off and disavowing the latter.").
226. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 96, art. 64.
227. Id.
228. Id. art. 68.
229.
230.
231.

Id. art. 76.
Id.at arts. 71-75.
Harris, supra note 225, at 117.

232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.at 118.
See generally Geneva Convention IV, supra note 96, arts. 47-78.
Harris, supra note 225, at 117.
Id.at 120.
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so long as those
services do not interfere with military necessity or its
236
security.
ownIn comparing
how the countries work to reconcile IHL and IHRL,
a
parallel can be drawn between the United States and Israel. The United
States claims IHL applies to its RPA operations, but still imposes some
IHRL restraints not required under IHL, and Israel claims that IHL
applies to its RPA operations, but applies IHRL to fill those gaps left in
IHL. And, in some very specific situations, both countries have applied
standards that go beyond those required under IHL and could be
considered IHRL. One example is that both the United States and Israel
reserve RPA targeted killing operations for exceptional circumstances.
For Israel, only as an exceptional step when no alternative exists, 237 and
for the United States, only when capture is infeasible. 238 These standards
are higher than required by IHL, which allows for combatants to be
targeted so long as minimal injury to civilians results. IHL does not
require military commanders to consider all other alternatives, such as
capture, before targeting a combatant. Another example from the United
States and United Kingdom is that both countries require that the casualty
rate for approval of any RPA targeted killing to be zero. 2 39 In other words,
if any non-combatants are at risk of death or serious injury, the operations
will not be approved and conducted. IHL does not require a zero noncombatant casualty rate. In fact, it anticipates some civilian casualties.
The IHL/IHRL debate as it relates specifically to RPA targeted killing
operations wages on and includes legal issues not easily resolved.
However, though operating in different legal landscapes (imposed by the
various treaties and conventions to which the countries are a party), each
country seems to be carefully navigating through its legal obligations and
not just rejecting them as claimed by some critics. The United Kingdom
likely has the most restrictive set of legal obligations, yet still is actively
involved in the development and use of RPAs in targeted killing
operations. The United Kingdom does not seem to be engaged in the use
of RPAs in these operations in those areas that both the United States and
Israel would claim the legal right to operate, those areas outside of Iraq,
Afghanistan, and Libya.
In the next Part, further in-depth review of specific IHL or Law of
Armed Conflict (LOAC) principles demonstrates that the United States,
the United Kingdom, and Israel use remarkably similar standards to meet
IHL obligations and the United States is not applying less stringent
standards than the United Kingdom and Israel in most. Still, in general,
236. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 96, arts. 47-78.
237. H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 13.
238. See infra text accompanying notes 332-33.
239. See infra text accompanying notes 348-49 (discussing to U.S. information); infra text
accompanying 383 (discussing U.K. information).
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all three countries could improve transparency and accountability of the
operations.
Furthermore, when looking to IHRL to fill the gaps left by IHL, while
similarities exist between the three countries, the United States may be
lagging behind the United Kingdom and Israel in one significant area,
that of accountability of civilian casualties after an operation. Of course,
the question remains as to what this means for the United States. This
Article asserts below that the United States could be doing a little more
in terms of civilian casualties. However, in light of the fact that the
obligations on the United Kingdom are heightened compared to the
United States based on the human rights conventions to which it is a
party, and the obligations placed on Israel are different than the United
States and the United Kingdom because they are subject to IHL's laws of
occupation, the question for the United States remains whether-and to
what extent-it also bears responsibility to increase accountability
despite the arguably lesser legal standards imposed on it.
B. Laws of War: Overview of the Basic LOAC Concepts
Under IHL,certain LOAC principles apply as customary international
law in both international and non-international armed conflicts. 240 These
principles include distinction, military necessity, proportionality, and
humanity, also known as unnecessary suffering. 24 1 One of the key areas
of dispute in the use of RPAs in targeted killings is whether the countries
242
that use them are fully complying with the basic IHL principles.
As a starting point, the United States, United Kingdom, and Israel all
firmly ground the conduct of their military members during all types of
military operations and during all types of armed conflicts, even those
with terrorists, within the bounds of the four basic LOAC principles.243
As a matter of policy, all U.S. military members are required to "comply
with the law of war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are
characterized, and in all other military operations." 244 By written
240. Alston, supra note 18, at 303; SoLIs, supra note 6, at 250-86 (discussing, in extensive
detail, the history of all four principles that constitute the core of LOAC and how they apply to
every armed conflict).
241. Seeid.
242. See Vogel, infra note 252, at 101-02.
243. See, e.g., Military Commission Act of 2009, infra note 267; Shiner & Carey, supra
note 23; Jewish Virtual Library, infra note 247.
244. DOD LAW OF WAR PROGRAM, DOD DIRECTIVE 2311.01 E (May 9,2006); see also, e.g.,
COMPLIANCE WITH THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT, A.F. POL'Y DIRECTIVE 51-4 (Aug. 4, 2011)

(stating that the U.S. "Air Force ensure its personnel understand, observe, and enforce LOAC and
the US Government's obligations under that law .... [Air Force] personnel [will] comply with
the LOAC during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other
military operations.").
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directive, U.S. military members receive training on LOAC at least
annually as well as before deployments overseas.2 45 The U.K. military
actions are guided by the Manual of the Law of Armed Conflict, which
discusses the LOAC principles in detail, along with the other obligations
imposed on U.K. military members by the Conventions.246 Finally, for
members of the Israeli Defence Forces, the IHL principles are "enshrined
in IDF training, Code of Ethics and rules of engagement." 247 This Article
will next explore the three countries' application of the principles to
demonstrate that, while the approaches may vary, the application by all
three is largely the same.
1. Distinction
Distinction is a principle at the core of IHL.2 4 8 To be a lawful
combatant means that you can engage in the conflict and be targeted in
return, a rule codified in Article 13(2) of Additional Protocol II of the
Geneva Conventions. 249 Specifically, under the Geneva Conventions,
lawful combatants are uniformed members of armed forces, who report
to a responsible chain of command, wear a distinctive insignia, carry their
arms openly, and conduct their actions in compliance with the laws of
50
war.

2

Civilians, on the other hand, are not legitimate targets "unless and for
such time as they take a direct part in hostilities." 25' Civilians who take
part in the hostilities at the time of the attack lose their protected status
and can be targeted, as well as face potential criminal charges for war
crimes. 252 Thus, the status of the individual-whether one is a combatant
245. Id.
246. See J.S.P. 383, supra note 158,
2.1-2.8.2.
247. Operationin Gaza, supra note 160, 6. See also Jewish Virtual Library, IsraelDefence
Forces:Ruach Tzahal- Code of Ethics, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_&_
Culture/IDFethics.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2014) (listing the IDF's three fundamental values
and ten additional values that spring from those, including, for example, the obligation to limit
injury to the extent required to accomplish the mission and the duty to limit the use of force to
prevent unnecessary harm to human life).
248. See SOLIS, supra note 6, at 251 ("Distinction, sometimes referred to as discrimination,
is the most significant battlefield concept a combatant must observe."); see Jean-Marie Henckaerts
& Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law Volume I. Rules,
International Committee of the Red Cross, at 3 (2005), available at http://www.icrc.org/eng/
assets/files/other/customary-international-humanitarian-law-i-icrc-eng.pdf
[hereinafter ICRC
Rules] ("The parties to the conflict must at all times distinguish between civilians and combatants
... Attacks may not be directed against civilians.").
249. Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 43(2); see also SoLIs, supra note 6, at 18791 (discussing the significance of the status of lawful combatant).
250. See Geneva Convention IV, supra note 96, art. 4A(2)(a)-(d).
251. Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 51(3).
252. Ryan Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
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or civilian-matters in determining whether one may be targeted. In this
way, IHL goes further in allowing lethal action than IHRL which would
require an imminent threat posed by each individual targeted and not just
based on an individual's status.253
Distinction also includes the prohibition against destruction of civilian
objects, unless justified by military necessity, 254 as well as against
intentionally attacking combatants who become unable to continue to
fight due to wounds, sickness, shipwreck or parachuting from a disabled
aircraft.255
The difficulty with applying the principle of distinction in armed
conflicts with terrorists, whether they are members of al Qaeda, the
Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, or other terrorist organizations, is that the
terrorists live and hide among communities of civilians. 256 Furthermore,
terrorist groups frequently use civilians and civilian objects as shields.257
For the use of RPAs to be lawful, those that operate them must be able to
distinguish between lawful combatants and civilians, as well as civilian
objects.258 Thus, countries involved in armed conflicts with terrorists
struggle with the question of who can be lawfully targeted, including who
qualifies as a combatant, and when individuals can be targeted, such as
when civilians who directly participate in hostilities lose their protected
status.259
Of course, even once it is determined that a particular individual can
be lawfully targeted as a combatant, the attack itself must also not be
indiscriminate. 26 This means that the military member performing the
RPA operation must ensure, in carrying out the attack, to take measures
to avoid hitting civilians and civilian objects.261
a. United States
Within the United States, the government has been walking the
tightrope since September 11, 2001 between, on the one hand, trying to
POL'Y 101, 124 (2010).
253. See Alston, supra note 18, at 303-04.
254. AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SCHOOL, AIR FORCE OPERATIONS AND THE
LAW: A GUIDE FOR AIR, SPACE, AND CYBER FORCES 17 (3d ed. 2014) (2009).

255.

Id.

256.

See Vogel, supra note 252, at 118 (indicating that "the enemy intentionally fails to

distinguish himself-indeed purposefully obfuscating his belligerent status by posing as a
civilian").
257. Id.
258.

Seeid. at 116-18.

259. See, e.g., Kenneth Watkin, Warriors Without Rights? Combatants Unprivileged
Belligerents, and the Struggle Over Legitimacy, HPCR Occasional Paper Series (Winter 2005).
260. See id. at 122.
261. Id.
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define terrorists in a way that provides transparency about who it believes
it can legally target extraterritorially and, on the other hand, not wanting
to limit the Executive's power to go after individuals that it deems as
imminent, dangerous threats.262 In the immediate wake of September 11,
Congress passed the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)
which authorized the President to use "all necessary and appropriate force
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines
planned,
263
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks.,
The Military Commissions Act of 2006 includes as "unlawful enemy
combatants" those individuals, including members of the "Taliban, al
Qaeda, or associated forces," who have "engaged in hostilities" or who
have "purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United
States or its co-belligerents." 264 Then, in 2009, seemingly unhappy with
the decision to provide habeas review to Hamdi,26 5 Congress passed the
Military Commission Act, labeling terrorists as "unprivileged enemy
belligerents" rather than "enemy combatants. 266 Specifically, the
"unprivileged enemy belligerent" is an individual who has "engaged in
hostilities against," or "purposefully and materially supported hostilities
against" the United States or its coalition partners,"
or who "was a part
267
of al Qaeda at the time of the alleged offense.
In addition to determining how to label the terrorists whom the United
States plans to target, the other area of much debate is the extension 268
of
the AUMF to al Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces.
Specifically, the critique is that this very vague language does not provide
enough clarification of who can be considered to be an "associated force,"
and there are no factors provided
for an assessment to be made whether
269
someone fits that definition.
262.

See Vogel, supra note 252, at 118-19.

263.

Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).

264. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
265. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (O'Connor, J. plurality) (holding that an
American citizen detainee "seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must
receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the
Government's factual assertions before a neutral decision maker.").
266. See Alberto R. Gonzales, Drones: The Power to Kill, 82 GEO. WASH. U. L. REv. 1, 18
(2013).
267. Military Commission Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-84, 123 Stat. 2574 (codified at 10
U.S.C. §§ 948a-950t (2012)). This difference in label is significant for a different reason as well.
By labeling terrorists as "unprivileged enemy belligerents," Congress is asserting its position that
terrorists should receive the very minimal protections provided by the Geneva Conventions. It is
a recognition that terrorists do not "play by the rules" required by IHL and, thus, should be treated
neither as either civilians, who can only be targeted while directly participating in hostilities, nor
combatants, who are entitled to a litany of protections during conflict and if detained.
268. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600.
269. See Daskal, supra note 72, at 1175-76 (noting that "[t]he conflict has exposed the gaps
in the legal framework governing the conduct of armed conflict.").
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b. United Kingdom
For the United Kingdom, the question of how to distinguish between
combatants and civilians for their military members has been confined to
the battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan. 270 Still, this is no easy task
because the terrorists, like members of the Afghanistan Taliban, for
example, are members of their community and intentionally fail to
distinguish themselves from civilians as required under LOAC. 7 '
The U.K. MOD has not yet released information to the public
regarding how they distinguish between civilians and combatants. 272 The
U.K. Joint Service Manual of the LOAC gives limited guidance. It directs
that any decision that civilians are taking a direct part in hostilities must
be "more narrowly construed than simply making a contribution to the
war effort., 273 "Thus working in a munitions factory or otherwise
supplying or supporting the war effort does not justify the targeting of
civilians so doing. However, munitions factories are legitimate military
targets and civilians working there, though not themselves legitimate
targets, are at risk if those targets are attacked. 274 This guidance is very
broad and leaves much discretion with the military commanders deciding
whether to conduct an operation.
Recently, the MOD made a statement to the British Parliament in
response to the specific question of how military members distinguish
between civilians and combatants.2 75 The MOD official stated that the
U.K. forces will conduct an investigation in "all circumstances where a
possible civilian casualty is reported.. .unless it can be established that
the individual was directly involved in immediate attempts or plans to
threaten the lives of International Security Assistance Force
personnel. 276 Thus, the MOD seems to place some importance on the
requirement that the individual be "directly" involved in "immediate"
hostilities. However, this is very limited information. It does not provide
further guidance on what is considered "immediate attempts or plans."
More specifically, a key question is whether the MOD's statement
imposes a Caroline doctrine type of immediacy or a more anticipatory
immediacy, such as the United States currently uses to justify its RPA
targeted killing operations. Furthermore, the MOD statement raises the
question of what actions by a civilian would constitute "attempts or

270.

See Shiner & Carey, supra note 23,

271.

Id.

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

Id. 4.43.
J.S.P. 383, supra note 158, 2.5.2
Id.
Shiner & Carey, supra note 23, 4.44.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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plans.

277

c. Israel
Confronting the difficulty of applying the distinction principle to
terrorists, the Israeli High Court of Justice held that terrorists are civilians
rather than combatants, which means they can only be attacked "for such
time as they take a direct part in hostilities." 278 At first blush, this
determination implies that Israel may be more limited than the United
States and United Kingdom in determining that someone is a combatant
for purposes of targeting.
As the Court's opinion continues, however, the standard for
determining someone is a combatant broadens. First, the Court
determined that participating in "hostilities" can include activities outside
of actual combat, such as gathering intelligence or preparing for the
hostilities. 279 Second, after noting that no accepted definition of "direct"
exists in the international literature, the court determined that it can
include collecting intelligence, providing transportation to other unlawful
280
combatants, supervising the operations, or providing services to them.
The Court then decided on an expansive test to apply to terrorists
when determining the meaning of "for such time."
[A] civilian who has joined a terrorist organization which has
become his "home," and in the framework of his role in that
organization he commits a chain of hostilities, with short periods
of rest between them, loses his immunity from attack "for such
time" as he is committing the chain of acts. Indeed, regarding such
is nothing other than
a civilian, the rest between hostilities
28 1
hostility.
next
the
for
preparation
Labeling the "terrorist" as a civilian, but applying such a broad
expansion to the activities of that civilian, to include all the activities he
committed as part of a "chain of hostilities" has been criticized as opening
the door too widely regarding the targeting of civilians.282 This is because
applying that broad definition to the "for such time" part of the provision
283
"threatens to drain close to all meaning from 'direct' participation."
Therefore, on the one hand, Israel's definition of who qualifies as a
277. Id.
278. Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 51(3); H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, T 24
("terrorist organizations... and their members, do not fulfill the conditions for combatants).
279. H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 33.
280. Id. 35.
281. Id. 39 (emphasis added).
282. Radsan & Murphy, supra note 4, at 1212.
283. Id.
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lawful target is broader than other countries because it allows for an
assessment that once someone commits a hostile act, he loses all
protection as a civilian, even if he later laid down his arms. On the other
hand, by finding the individuals to be "civilians taking direct part in
hostilities," the Israeli High Court ensured that the targeted individuals
are afforded all of the protections
of the Geneva Conventions when not
284
participating in hostilities.
d. Comparing the Countries: Individual Threat Finding
With RPAs comes the ability to target terrorists from long range and
at any time, thus meeting the principle of distinction becomes extremely
important. RPA operators must be able to identify targets and verify with
certainty the target is the terrorist and not another civilian.
Staying true to the IHL framework, Israel decided to tackle the
problem by applying the same definition of combatant for international
armed conflicts to terrorists involved in non-international armed
conflicts. Thus, classifying terrorists as civilians rather than combatants,
who are not legitimate targets "unless and until such time as they take a
direct part in hostilities."' 285 This classification is consistent with its
obligations as an occupying power in those territories it occupies because,
under article 4 of the Geneva Conventions IV, persons within a territory
and who "find themselves . . . in the hands of a Party to the conflict or
Occupying Power of which they are not nationals" are protected by the
Convention.286 Israel has some heightened obligations to protect those
civilians found in those occupied territories against "certain
consequences of war" 287 that do not apply to RPA targeted killing
operations occurring in territory not occupied.
In armed conflict, applying a strict "direct part in hostilities" (DPH)
test can be difficult. The International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC) highlights the problem with applying this rule to terrorists.
[The rule] appears to create an imbalance between such groups and
governmental armed forces. Application ... would imply that an
attack on members of armed opposition groups is only lawful for
"such time as they take a direct part in hostilities" while an attack
on members of governmental armed forces would be lawful at any
time. Such imbalance would not exist if members of the armed
opposition groups were, due to their membership, either
considered to be continuously taking a direct part in hostilities or
284. Blum & Heymann, supra note 11, at 157-58.
285. Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 51(3).
286. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 96, art. 4.
287. Id.
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not considered to be civilians.288
Israel pays heed to the ICRC's guidance by classifying terrorists as
civilians, but also broadening what it means to directly participate in
hostilities. The Court applied a "chain of hostilities" test because, for the
terrorists involved in the armed conflict, "the rest between hostilities is
nothing other than preparation for the next hostility. ' 289 In application,
the question is whether actions that may normally not be considered
hostile acts become interpreted as such when an individual chooses to
participate in activities with other known terrorists. The Court noted that
providing transportation and other services to known terrorists may be
considered hostile acts. This seems to imply that a civilian who
unknowingly drives a terrorist around more than one time, like a family
friend or neighbor, becomes a lawful target as "participating directly in
this way, the test leads to concerns of overhostilities." In
290
inclusiveness.
Because the Israeli model, however, labels terrorists as civilians, the
High Court emphasized that requires a decision regarding whether a
particular individual is "directly participating in hostilities," which means
that Israeli armed forces must engage in a case-by-case specific inquiry
into the individual culpability of the alleged terrorists. 29 1 And, the inquiry
would have to be conducted every time the Israeli Defense Forces are
contemplating targeting a particular individual. Thus, soldiers are
required to perform a sort of individual assessment of the threat of each
potential target.
The United States may also already be engaging in a sort of
"individualized threat finding" (ITF), similar to the one required by the
Israeli High Court's opinion. 292 The U.S. Executive Branch consistently
claims that a very fact-specific and intense process is used to determine
whether3 an individual should be put on the list of targets for lethal
force.

29

288. ICRC Rules, supra note 248, at 21.
289. H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 39 (emphasis added).
290. Radsan & Murphy, supra note 4, at 1212.
291. Blum & Heymann, supra note 11, at 158.
292. The U.S. process for vetting potential targets for lethal operations has of course
changed over time. Specifically, in contrast to President Bush, President Obama decided to begin
personally signing off on every strike in Yemen and Somalia, as well as the more complex and
risky strikes in Pakistan. Becker & Shane, supra note 2, at 7.
293. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 29 (emphasizing the "rigorous standards and process of
review" which the government follows when authorizing RPA strikes outside the hot battlefield
of Afghanistan); White House Fact Sheet, supra note 131, at 1 (emphasizing that the United States
"will use lethal force only against a target that poses a continuing, imminent threat to U.S.
persons."). This same recent policy guidance released by the White House provided a vague
unhelpful definition of "non-combatant" as
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For an individual to be considered as a legitimate target, he must be
involved in the planning and coordination of operations that present a
future threat or risk to American lives. 294 The individual must either be
an operational leader of al-Qaeda or associated force, or an operative in
the midst of actually training for or planning to carry out an attack against
U.S. interests. 2929 According to the U.S. government, included in the
analysis of whether a particular individual can be lethally targeted are
also: a broad analysis of an intended target's current and past role in plots
threatening U.S. persons; relevant intelligence information the individual
could provide; and the potential impact of the operation on ongoing
terrorism plotting, on the capabilities of terrorist
organizations, on its
296
collection.
intelligence
on
and
relations,
foreign
Independent research supports the government's position that some
form of an individualized threat finding is conducted for each person that
is targeted.297 In his case study, which included review of military
documents, court filings, public statements by government officials, as
well as confidential interviews with members of the military and
intelligence community, Professor Gregory McNeal determined that the
lists of individuals to be targeted for lethal action are "vetted through an
elaborate bureaucratic process that allows for verification of intelligence
information prior to the placement" on the list.29 8 He uncovered an
intense and rigorous process which begins with data gathering by military
and intelligence community members, and continues with
recommendations vetted by officials at the National Counterterrorism
Center, who send those recommendations to the National Security
Council and the President. 299 This is the process just to put potential
names on the target list. It is then followed by another elaborate process
to actually execute the targeted kill.3 °°
McNeal's findings illustrate that individuals are placed on the target
list based on "certain strategic objectives, which lead to targeting

not includ[ing] an individual who is a part of a belligerent party to an armed
conflict, an individual who is taking a direct part in hostilities, or an individual
who is targetable in the exercise of nationalself-defense. Males of military age

may be non-combatants; it is not the case that all military-aged males in the
vicinity of a target are deemed to be combatants.
Id. at 2 n. 1 (emphasis added).
294. Brennan, supra note 29, at 5.

295.

Id.

296.
297.

White House Fact Sheet, supra note 13 1,at 2.
McNeal, supranote 19, at 22-23.

298.
299.
300.

Id.
Id.
Id.at 53-80.
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decisions based on how engaging targets will impact the enemy's
decision-making process and activities." 30 1 The in-depth analysis
includes questions such as whether the individual is sufficiently tied to
the core of al Qaeda, whether striking that individual will harm al
Qaeda, 30 2 how valuable that particular individual is to al Qaeda, and the
effect eliminating him will have on the enemy group's war-making or
war-fighting capability. 30 3 Then, after being placed on the target list, the
vetting process includes an assessment by top government officials,
including questions such as the impact of not conducting operations
against the target, whether "striking a particular individual will improve
world standing and whether
the strike is worth it in terms of weakening
30 4
the adversary's power."
So, if the United States and Israel are already engaging in an
"individualized threat finding," one might ask, what is the problem? Does
this Article merely articulate a request for more transparency, for
example, for written guidance specifically outlining the test's factors and
calling it an "individualized threat finding"? Actually, that would be the
easiest and best case scenario. However, at present, based on the frequent
news stories about RPA strikes in various countries outside the zones of
active hostilities, the public is left wondering what makes someone a
target. For example, at least one news source claims that current RPA
strikes by the United States in Yemen are authorized to target "people
who are displaying the behaviors of suspected militants" rather than
specific known terrorists. 30 5 Thus, it is far from clear what standards the
United States and Israel are applying to strike terrorists in the RPA
strikes.
In the United States, the executive could adopt some sort of a
formalized "individualized threat finding" for each RPA targeted killing
operation. 30 6 Professor Daskal advocates for an ITF for each target
301. Id.at 29.
302. Id.at 29-31
303. Id.at 36.
304. Id.at 46.
305. Bergen, supra note 123.
306. In the context of non-criminal military detention, Professor Jack Goldsmith has urged
Congress to pass legislation that specifically defines the enemy who may be subject to detention
because the definition that currently exists under the AUMF is too broad and indeterminate. See
Jack Goldsmith, Long-Term TerroristDetention and Our National Security Court (Brookings
Inst., Georgetown Univ. Law Ctr., Hoover Inst. Jt. Project, Working Paper No. 5, 2009), available
at http://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2009/02/09-detention-goldsmith. If Congress were
to do so, this would certainly help increase transparency to the public regarding RPA targeted
killing operations because the government would also need to use that legal definition as part of
the ITF. However, it would not eliminate the need for the ITF because, due to the very nature of
RPA targeted killings operations which foreclose all other outcomes except death-versus
detention, RPA targeted killings operations can and should require a higher standard of
determination of the need for the targeted killing. Id.
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located in those zones outside of active hostilities. 30 7 The lethal targeting
categories would include individuals engaged in the active planning or
operationalization of imminent attacks, regardless of their position in the
terrorist organization, and leaders who present a significant and ongoing
threat, even if they are not implicated in the planning of an imminent
attack.3 °8 Professor Daskal argues that her categories are more restrictive
than those currently used by the government because no low-level or midlevel operatives could be targeted unless specifically involved in plotting
or recruiting for a specific, imminent attack.3" 9
Professor Daskal's "zone approach" could help answer concerns from
those who advocate that IHRL only applies outside of active hostilities.
Under IHRL, the definition of "imminence" is more restrictive than under
IHL. By applying the zone approach, the definition of an imminent attack
is more restrictive. However, others reject this zone approach as being
unworkable. The vast majority of experts at the recent meeting held by
the ICRC, regardless of whether they favored IHL or IHRL paradigm for
areas outside of active hostilities, thought that the factor of the conflict
zone should not be added as relevant when deciding whether someone
could be targeted.310 Specifically, they thought that the conflict zone
determination was "too subjective, too open to debate and
misinterpretation or disagreement.", 311 Problems may include, for
example, determining who would ultimately decide whether an area was
considered to be in armed conflict, whether encampments further
removed from the center of the battlefield would be different target zones,
and whether the same procedures would apply in an area where a civilian
is directly participating in hostilities but where no conflict zone has been
officially identified.
Rather than establishing a new legal framework that may invite
subjective inquiries about whether a zone is a conflict zone, an ITF should
be conducted for each target that is placed on the target list. This is not to
say, however, that the ITF will be conducted at the same level of intensity
of review for every target. Targeting decisions regarding RPAs can be
accomplished at different levels of authority. The Rules of Engagement
(ROEs) for a specific armed conflict should include direction on who can
authorize attacks using RPAs in that commander's Area of Responsibility
307. Daskal, supra note 72, at 1210; see also Special Rapporteur Report (Emmerson), supra
note 38, 59 (expressing concern that, "while the United States appears to accept that resort to
anticipatory self-defense is constrained by the principle of imminence, it interprets this standard
as a flexible one," and one that "does not involve a requirement to have clear evidence that a
specific attack will be carried out in the immediate future).
308. Daskal, supra note 72, at 1210.
309. Id. at 1211.
310. ICRC Expert Meeting, supranote 212, at 22.
311. Id.
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(AOR).3 12 In certain AORs, higher levels of authority can be designated
than others. Of course, because the military has already withdrawn from
Iraq and is withdrawing from Afghanistan, 3 13 RPA targeted killing
operations for the foreseeable future will be limited to those outside the
zones of active hostilities. This simply strengthens the argument for an
ITF in every RPA operation moving forward, at least until the military
once again enters into an armed conflict in another country. At that time,
the relevant ROEs can include guidance of who has authority to conduct
an ITF determination.
For Israel and the United Kingdom, the format of a required ITF for
each individual targeted by an RPA is applicable as well. The Israel High
Court of Justice already determined that an ITF was required to be done.
By requiring ITFs for all RPA targets, the Israel Defence Force, and the
U.K. and U.S. militaries could set an example for other countries to
follow as they obtain the technology to be able to conduct RPA targeted
killing operations.
2. Military Necessity
Military necessity legalizes the use of force that might otherwise be
unlawful, even if it results in deaths or destruction, so long as it is
necessary to achieve the military objective sought and conducted in
accordance with the other LOAC rules. 3 14 No set list of factors exists to
determine whether a lethal action is necessary to achieve the military
objective. Based on the Hague and Geneva Conventions and state
practice, the ICRC provided some elaboration on the rules regarding
military necessity. For example, if the primary purpose of a particular
operation is to spread terror among civilians, that act is prohibited.3 1 5
Indiscriminate attacks, including those not directed at a specific military
objective, which employ a method or means that cannot be directed at a

312.

ROE are "directives issued by competent military authority that delineate the

circumstances and limitations under which U.S. forces will initiate and/or continue combat
engagement with other forces encountered." U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Pub. 1-02,
Dictionaryof MilitaryandAssociatedTerms (Nov. 8,2010) (as amended through Nov. 15,2014).

313. The United States and Afghanistan signed a Bilateral Security Agreement on
September 30th that will decrease the number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan to 9800 for 2015,
further decrease by about half in 2016, and just leave minimal troops in Afghanistan for basic
Embassy security starting in 2017. Sudarsan Raghauan & Karen DeYoung, United States and
Afghanistan Sign Vital, Long-DelayedSecurity Pact, WASH. POST, Sept. 30, 2014, http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/us-afghanistan-sign-security-pact-to-allow-american-forces-to-remai
n-in-country/2014/09/30/48f555ce-4879-1 1e4-a046-120a8a855cca-story.html.
314. See SOLIS, supra note 6, at 259 (discussing the history of military necessity and citing
the post-World War II "Hostage case," during which Nazi officers were tried, which explains
military necessity in more detail).
315. ICRC Rules, supra note 248, at 2.
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specific military
objective, or limited as required by 1HL, are also
3 16

prohibited.

The duty to determine what constitutes military necessity falls on the
commander on the battlefield. 3 17 Just like with the principle of distinction,

the commander must conduct a case-by-case analysis before an RPA
targeted killing operation that a particular strike is necessary to achieve a
military objective. 318 There is no comparable principle in IHRL, which
only allows the use of lethal force for imminent protection of self or
others and does not legitimatize killing civilians in order to meet some
other goal or objective.
a. United States
The U.S. Army Field Manual defines military necessity as "that
principle which justifies those measures not forbidden by international
law which are indispensable for securing the complete submission of the
enemy as soon as possible." 319 The Commander's Handbook on the Law
of Naval Operations provides that "[o]nly that degree and kind of force,
not otherwise prohibited by the law of armed conflict, required for the
partial or complete submission of the enemy with a minimum expenditure
of time, life, and physical resources may be applied., 320 Publicly, senior
U.S. government officials, including President Obama, tout the necessity
of RPA 1targeted killing operations solely to stop an imminent terrorist
32
threat.

316.
317.
318.

Id.at40.
SOLIs, supra note 6, at 264.
Vogel, supra note 252, at 116; see also AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
SCHOOL, supra note 254, at 15 (noting that "commanders and others responsible for planning,
deciding upon or executing military operations necessarily have to reach decisions on the basis of
their assessment of the information from all sources which is available to them at the relevant
time").
319. DEP'T OF THE ARMY,FIELD MANUAL 27-10, The Law ofLand Warfare, 3.a, at 4 (1956)
(emphasis added) [hereinafter FIELD MANUAL 27-10].

320. DEP'T OF THE NAVY, COMMANDER'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
NWP I-14M, 5.2 (July 2007).
321. See, e.g., President Obama Speech, supra note 1, at 4 ("America does not take strikes
to punish individuals; we act against terrorists who pose a continuing and imminent threat to the
American people, and when there are no other governments capable of effectively addressing the
threat"); White House Fact Sheet, supra note 131, at 1-2 (emphasis added) ("[1]ethal force will
be used only to prevent or stop attacks against U.S. persons, and even then, only when capture is
not feasible and no other reasonablealternativesexist to address the threateffectively"); Holder
Letter, supra note 30, at 2 (lethal force will be used against one "who is actively engaged in
planning to kill Americans" under certain circumstances, including after the "U.S. government
has determined, after a thorough and careful review, that the individual poses an imminent threat
of violent attack against the United States").
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b. United Kingdom
The MOD's LOAC Manual provides a definition of military
necessity:
Military necessity permits a state engaged in an armed conflict to
use only that degree and kind of force, not otherwise prohibited by
the law of armed conflict, that is required in order to achieve the
legitimate purpose of the conflict, namely the complete or partial
submission of the enemy at the earliest possible
moment with the
322
resources.
and
life
of
minimum expenditure
In the U.K. Manual, "partial" submission was added to the definition
to recognize that armed conflict can have a limited purpose, such as the
termination of the occupation of Kuwait in 1991.323 Thus, arguably, the
United Kingdom may find an operation complete, or deem the military
objective met, at an earlier stage than U.S. operations since the United
Kingdom permits enough force for partial submission of the enemy in
some operations. On the other hand, guidance from the U.S. Naval
Operations Handbook also includes partial submission as a possibility.
Thus, in actual armed conflict, the fact that "partial" is left out of the
Army Field Manual may not really indicate a difference between the U.S.
and U.K. application of the military necessity principle.
The U.K. LOAC Manual is more detailed than the U.S. Army Field
Manual because it also divides military necessity into four basic
elements. First, that "force used can be and is being controlled. 324
Second, "necessity cannot excuse a departure from that law." 325 Third,
"the use of force in ways which are not otherwise prohibited is legitimate
if it is necessary to achieve, as quickly as possible, the complete or partial
submission of the enemy." 326 Finally, "the use of force which is not
327
necessary is unlawful, since it involves wanton killing or destruction."
c. Israel
In the publicly-available materials from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign
Defence, no particular definition of military necessity is provided.
Instead, military necessity is discussed as being incorporated into the two
principles of distinction and proportionality. For example, as explained
322.
323.
324.

J.S.P. 383, supra note 158,
Id 2.2 n.2.
Id. 2.2.1.

325.
326.

Id.
Id.

327.

Id.

2.2.
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by the Ministry of Foreign Defence in its paper discussing the factual and
legal aspects of the 2008 Operation in Gaza,
[t]he two critical aspects of [the jus in bello] limitation principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality both designed to protect civilians not taking direct part in
hostilities and civilian objects, while taking into account
328
military necessities and the exigencies of the situation.

the
are
the
the

Further, a core proposition for the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Defence
is that LOAC balances two competing considerations and its "rules
329
comply with both military necessity and the dictates of humanity."
The fact that military necessity is not specifically defined, by itself, is
not problematic because the four LOAC principles are so intertwined.
However, in justifying its actions in the 2008 Gaza Operation, rather than
focus on whether a particular operation qualifies as meeting military
necessity, the Israeli military's focus is on whether something is a "lawful
military objective., 330 Although Israel is not a party to Additional
Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, the Israeli Defense Force cites the
Additional Protocol in defining military objectives as those objects which
"make an effective contribution to military action and whose partial or
circumstances ruling at
total destruction, capture or neutralization, in the
331
the time, offers a definite military advantage."
Whether something is a legitimate military objective is a different
question than whether a particular use of force is necessary to meet a
military objective. Furthermore, just because an object can be found to be
a legitimate military objective does not necessarily equate its destruction
to meeting the military necessity test. For example, dropping a bomb on
the home of a civilian, who is not a Hamas member, where Hamas
members gathered to distribute weapons may be a legitimate military
objective because destroying it would eliminate the risk of those Hamas
members attacking Israeli forces later with those weapons. However,
destroying the home-a civilian object (as well possibly any non-Hamas
civilians also inside)--may not be militarily necessary because it does
not contribute to the overall objective of the submission of Hamas. In
other words, it may stop those particular fighters, but the unlawfulness of
striking the civilian home and civilians inside is not outweighed by the
necessity of stopping those fighters based on the minimal threat they
present at that time. If those same Hamas members were to gather at a
different location later that presented no danger to civilians or civilian
328. Operationin Gaza, supra note 160, 89.
329. Id. 33.
330. Id. 101 (citing Additional Protocol 1, supra note 88, art. 52(2)).
331. Id.
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objects, the answer to the military necessity question may change.
Yet, when discussing targeted killings before the High Court of
Justice, the Israel government's position was more limited than the IDF's
written materials imply. 332 The government explained that targeted
killings are in fact reserved for exceptional circumstances, indicating they
are used only when they meet military necessity. Specifically:
Targeted killings are performed only as an exceptional step, when
there is no alternative to them. Its goal is to save lives. It is
considered at the highest levels of command ....

In the cases in

which security officials are of the opinion that alternatives to
targeted killing exist, such alternatives are implemented to the
extent possible. At times targeted killing missions have been
canceled, when it has turned out that there is no possibility of
performing them without disproportionately endangering innocent
333
persons.

d. Comparing the Countries: Greater Transparency
The definitions of military necessity used by the United States and the
United Kingdom are very similar, using words such as "indispensable"
and "required" to meet the military objective. The two definitions are also
in line with the Israeli Defence Force position on targeted killings, that
they are only used as a last resort. Thus, for all three countries, the
application of the principle of military necessity to RPA targeted killing
operations means that, because by definition, targeted killings have
foreclosed the possibility of capture, resort to them must be reserved for
exceptional circumstances.
Additionally, the State conducting the RPA operation must ensure that
the primary objective of the targeted killing is to prevent an imminent
terrorist attack and that it is not being conducted for past activity by that
individual, in other words, that it is "neither punishment nor reprisal for
an act committed., 334 Before conducting an RPA targeted killing
operation, it must be determined that the only way to stop the attack, in
order to save lives, is to send the RPA to eliminate the individual about
to commit the attack.
Accordingly, both the United States and Israel claim that the use of
RPAs for targeted killings is considered at the highest levels of approval.
Both countries claim that targeted killings are only used when capture is
not feasible. The White House highlighted that the "policy of the United
States is not to use lethal force when it is feasible to capture a terrorist
332.
333.
334.

H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50,
Id.
Guiora, supra note 6, at 331.

13.
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suspect, because capturing a terrorist offers the best opportunity to gather
335
meaningful intelligence and to mitigate and disrupt terrorist plots."
Despite claims by U.S. and Israeli government officials that the
targeted killings thus far conducted have been necessary, the counterpoint
is that the frequency with which targeted killings are occurring brings
doubts to their claims. The position of the United Kingdom is also
interesting to consider. The U.K. MOD claims that they do not conduct
RPA targeted killing operations outside Libya, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
This indicates that they have not yet found it necessary to target terrorists
located outside those countries. And, this is despite the fact that, because
they work in close coordination with the United States, it is very likely
they share at least some intelligence information gathered by the United
States. It is possible this difference is based on the heightened U.K.
obligations under IHRL, but the U.K. MOD has been careful not to
publicly make statements regarding this distinction or in any way publicly
argue against the practices of the United States, its ally.
In sum, if a commander is ordering soldiers to take lethal action on a
battlefield against a uniformed enemy combatant, the LOAC rule of
military necessity works to shield that commander from any criminal
charges that would normally be brought for murder. But, when a
commander is ordering lethal action against enemy forces located in
another sovereign, it would probably be beneficial for the government to
provide more information to the public to prove military necessity than
just a statement that the lethal action was necessary. If the government
instead performed some sort of Individualized Threat Finding (ITF) for
every individual who is the target of an RPA operation, and eventually
released unclassified portions of that ITF or at least a listing of the
specific factors considered to justify the action even if not specific to
certain individuals, the increased transparency would
enable the public to
336
actions.
such
of
necessity
military
the
understand

335. White House Fact Sheet, supra note 131, at ]. See also President Obama Speech, supra
note 1,at 4 (stating that the President would have captured Anwar Awlaki and prosecuted him if
able, but capture was not possible and because Anwar was "continuously trying to kill people,"
the President would have been "derelict in [his] duty had [he] not authorized the strike that took
him out"); Brennan, supra note 29, at 4 ("our unqualified preference is to only undertake lethal
force when we believe that capturing the individual is not feasible").
336. This is not to advocate for the release of classified information that would be related to
future operations or the release of which would harm national security or risk particular operations
(or the individual involved in the operations). However, the government could release information
similar to information about Anwar Awlaki and the continuous threat he posed up until his death.
See President Obama Speech, supra note 1, at 4. The ITF would provide a more formalized
method of producing such information.
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3. Proportionality
The basic rule of proportionality is that any attack must be
proportional to the anticipated military advantage, or alternatively, it
"requires that the losses resulting from a military action should not be
excessive in relation to the expected military advantage." 337 Specifically,
a violation of the proportionality principle would be "[1]aunching an
attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military
' 338
anticipated.
advantage
Proportionality is defined in Additional Protocol I, which applies to
international armed conflicts and to which, of the three countries
discussed in this Article, only the United Kingdom is party, as noted
earlier. In a study on customary international law, however, the ICRC
found this principle as applied to both international and non-international
armed conflicts to be part of state practice, even those states not party to
the Additional Protocol.339 Proportionality does not require that no
civilian casualties result in armed conflict. On the contrary, it anticipates
that losses of civilians or civilians' objects are a possibility, but the losses
must not be excessive to the military objective.34 °
Thus, proportionality would require an assessment of the strategic
benefit of eliminating the targeted individual. For example, higher risks
of collateral damage might be accepted for targets of higher rank in the
terrorist organization or based on that individual's capability for future
34
harm. '

Proportionality also requires an assessment of the impact of the
various types of weapons possible to achieve the military objective.
Additional Protocol I requires legal review of new weapons. 342 "[T]he
military planner ...

needs not only to assess what feasible precautions

can be taken to minimize incidental loss but also to make a comparison
between different methods of conducting operations, so as to be able to
3 43
choose the least damaging method compatible with military success."

Under the Hague II Conventions, Article 23, specific types of actions are
specifically prohibited, such as employing "poison or poisoned arms,"
337. J.S.P. 383, supranote 158, 2.6. See also Kretzmer, supra note 78, at 200 ("While this
principle is as firmly entrenched in IHL as any, it is notoriously difficult to apply.").
338. ICRC Rules, supra note 248, at 46.
339. Id.
340. See SOLIS, supra note 6, at 273.
341. Vogel, supra note 252, at 126.
342. Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 36.
343. J.S.P. 383, supra note 158, 2.7; see also Hague 11 (1899) art. 22 (declaring that the
"right of belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited").
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killing or wounding the enemy "treacherously," or employing "arms,
344
projectiles, or material of a nature to cause superfluous injury."
Additionally, Article 25, prohibits the "attack or [aerial] bombardment of
towns, villages, habitations or buildings which are not defended. 345
Finally, though the law is unsettled, proportionality may also include an
the attacking forces in relation
assessment of the amount of risk faced by
346
to the minimization of risk to civilians.
a. United States
Though not party to Additional Protocol I, the United States requires
its military commanders to consider the proportionality principle in all
operations.
The principle of proportionality is considered by a commander in
determining whether, in engaging in offensive or defense
operations, his actions may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the
concrete 7and direct military advantage anticipated by those
actions.

34

In its RPA targeted killing operations, the U.S. position is that,
although some civilian casualties are "a risk that exists in every war,"
"before any strike is taken, there must be near-certainty that no civilians
will be killed or injured., 348 While this language may not seem to offer
much detail about what civilian casualty rates are acceptable, the actual
planning process used by the United States to determine estimated and
acceptable civilian casualty rates is very complex. The casualty rate
art. 23.
344. Hague Conventions I1,
345. Id.art. 25.
346. For further discussion on the debate regarding whether military forces must consider
least harmful means, even in the face of increased risk, see Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or
Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR. J.INT'L LAW 819 (2013) (amassing support for a least
harmful means or least restrictive means test, but limiting it to those situations that would not pose
any risk to the attacking force).
347. FIELD MANUAL 27-10, supra note 319, 41.
348. President Obama Speech, supra note 1, at 4; see also White House Fact Sheet, supra
note 131, at 2 (noting that before a lethal action may be taken, there must be "near certainty that
non-combatants will not be killed or injured"); Koh, supra note 28, at 8 (noting that the principle

of distinction "requires that attacks be limited to military objectives and that civilians or civilian
objects ... not be the object of attack"); Brennan, supra note 29, at 3 (stating that the "[t]argeted
strikes conform to the principle of proportionality" and "[b]y targeting an individual terrorist or
small numbers of terrorists with ordnance that can be adapted to avoid harming others in the
immediate vicinity, it is hard to imagine a tool that can better minimize the risk to civilians than

remotely piloted aircraft").
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estimate "is influenced by demographic and cultural factors such 349
as
region."
a
within
activities
night
and
day
for
norms
socialized cultural
Upon conducting a proportionality review, the United States has decided
not to strike certain military
objectives in order to avoid the injury or
350
death of innocent civilians.
Although the United States is not party to Additional Protocol I, a
legal review is conducted of all U.S. weapons, weapons systems, and
munitions to ensure compliance with "all applicable domestic law and
treaties,. . . international agreements (for arms control agreements...),
customary international law, and the law of armed conflict ... ,,351 This
review must be conducted before the contract for development of the
weapon is awarded.352 According to the U.S. Army, the "weapons review
process of the United States entitles commanders and all other personnel
to assume that any weapon or munition contained in the U.S. military
inventory and issued to military personnel is lawful. 353 This is an
example of how the United States follows certain Geneva Conventions to
which it is not party as rules of customary international law.
Regarding RPAs, senior government officials have consistently
touted their legality. Specifically, RPAs are a "wise choice" as a weapon
because they "strike their targets with astonishing precision,"
"dramatically reduce the danger to U.S. personnel, even eliminating the
danger altogether," and "dramatically reduce the danger to innocent
civilians, especially considered against massive 354
ordinance that can cause
injury and death far beyond its intended target."
There is disagreement with the U.S. Government's position that RPAs
are sufficiently minimizing civilian casualties based on the wide gap
between the assessments of the U.S. government of civilian casualties
and those provided by nongovernmental organizations. These numbers
are worthy of further exploration.
Beginning with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, certain
acceptable collateral damage rates were set by the President or the
Secretary of Defense for operations in the areas of hostilities. 355 The
numbers changed depending on the ongoing hostilities, but in Iraq in
2003, the number set for non-combatant casualties was thirty. 356 This
349.
350.
351.
12, 2003)
352.
353.

McNeal, supra note 19, at 751.
Brennan, supra note 29, at 5.
Dep't of Def. Directive 5000.01, The Defense Acquisition System, para. E1.1.15. (May
(certified current as of Nov. 20, 2007).
Id.
U.S. ARMY, OPERATIONAL LAW HANDBOOK, supra note 106, at 17.

354. Id.; see also President Obama Speech, supra note 1 (noting that "[c]onventional
airpower and missiles are far less precise than drones, and are likely to cause more civilian
casualties and more local outrage").
355. McNeal, supra note 19, at 751.
356. Id. at 752.
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meant that if a commander determined that an operation might result in
more than thirty civilian deaths, he had to elevate his request to conduct
that operation to the Commander of the entire operations in Iraq. 357 358
In
one.
was
operations
preplanned
for
number
the
Afghanistan,
in
2009,
Thus, if a strike was expected to result in even one casualty, it would need
to be approved by a much higher level of command authority.3 59 These
examples provide very limited information about the complexity of
military planning that goes into an RPA targeted killing operation
regarding collateral damage, but are provided merely to demonstrate that
the principle of distinction in practice is much more complex than the
definition implies.
The Special Rapporteur appointed by the U.N. to study RPA targeted
killing operations specifically noted that "up to the end of 2012,
confirmed strikes appeared to have inflicted significantly lower levels of
civilian casualties than aerial attacks carried out by other air
platforms. ' '360 However, numbers for 2013 were worse, indicating that

RPA strikes accounted for "almost 40% of the total number of civilian
fatalities," which represents a three-fold increase
in the number of
361
recorded civilian casualties from RPA strikes.
In Yemen, the cited numbers vary between 81 and 87 civilians killed,
out of a total number of between 811 and 1073 individuals killed.3 62 The
Special Rapporteur notes that the number of RPA strikes in Yemen
increased, "resulting in a significant number of reported civilian
casualties in the final weeks of 2013."363 A news article dated April 21,
2014, claiming that another two strikes were conducted in Yemen within
the previous few days, killing at least364
fifteen terrorists, supports that RPA
strikes are still increasing in Yemen.
The divergence in reported numbers of civilian casualties from RPA
operations in Pakistan is almost as large as the variance among the
number of operations said to have been conducted there by the United
States.365 Determining the number of civilian casualties in Pakistan is
357.
358.

Id.
Id.

359. Id. at 753.
360.

Emmerson ThirdReport to H.R.C., supra note 119,

361. Id.
362. NEW AMERICA

supra note 19 (citing the total number individuals killed

FOUNDATION,

in Yemen between 820 and 1082,
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM,

25.

including between 81 and 87 civilians); BUREAU OF

supra note 19 (citing the total number of individuals killed in Yemen

between 371 and 1094, including between 64 and 151 civilians).
363. Emmerson ThirdReport to H.R.C., supra note 119, 27.
364. See supra text accompanying note 123.
365. See, e.g., Haq Nawaz Khan & Greg Miller, Suspected US.DroneKills Six; US. Denies
Pakistan's Claim that Seminary was Target, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.

washingtonpost.com/world/us-drone-hits-islamic-seminary-in-pakistan/2013/11/21/c8cd26d6-5
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much more difficult than Iraq and Afghanistan because of the way the
operations are run there, and by whom, and who is providing the casualty
numbers. The existence of the RPA targeted killing program in Pakistan
remained technically classified.366 Therefore, the government continues
to deny operations there, and the public information on casualty rates
comes from interviews that some groups have conducted with civilians
on the ground, 367
but also from the Pakistan Taliban, who report to the
Pakistani press.

The available numbers on strikes in Pakistan vary anywhere between
258 and 959 civilians killed by RPA strikes, out of a total number of
individuals killed between 2184 and 3559.368 One source lists the total
number of known strikes to be 344, and if correct, that would mean that
somewhere between 8% and 47% of the RPA strikes in Pakistan are
causing civilian casualties. 369 According to the Special Rapporteur's
February 2014 report to the Human Rights Council, the number of strikes
in Pakistan is decreasing. At the time of this report, there were no known
strikes in 2014.370 However, according to the New American Foundation,
the strikes in Pakistan started again
in June and numbered somewhere
37 1
around 22 by the end of the year.
RPA operations in Somalia have thus far numbered far less than in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan or Yemen. The numbers provided by
government watchdog groups list the total number of individuals killed
in the Somalia
strikes to be between 16 and 30, including 0 to 1
2
civilian.

37

Many scholars, including those who advocate for the continued use of
RPAs, stress that the lack of information about civilian casualties
contributes to a lack of transparency and accountability that is needed in
285-11 e3-9ee6-2580086d8254_story.html (citing a specific RPA strike which Pakistan officials
claim killed six people, including at least two civilians, and which American officials claim no
civilian casualties).
366. Special Rapporteur Report (Emmerson), supra note 38, 46.
367. McNeal, supra note 19, at 755; see also Mayer, supra note 4 (asserting that while the
"reports of fatal air strikes in Pakistan emerge every few days," the "stories are often secondhand
and difficult to confirm, as the Pakistani government and the military have tried to wall off the
tribal areas from journalists"); Special Rapporteur Report (Emmerson), supra note 38,
32-33
(noting the significant variation in civilian casualty rates recorded by government officials, other
military officials, and the principal media monitoring organizations).
368.

NEw AMERICA FOUNDATION, supra note 19 (listing the total number individuals killed

in Pakistan between 2206 and 3583, including between 258 and 307 civilians); BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, supra note 19 (estimating the total number individuals killed in
Pakistan between 2400 and 3888, including between 416 and 959 civilians)
369. McNeal, supra note 19, at 755.
370. Emmerson Third Report to H.R.C., supra note 119, 26.
371. NEW AMERICA FOUNDATION, supra note 19.
372.

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, supra note 19.
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the process.37 3 Professor Phillip Alston summarizes the concern of many
scholars by stating, "[flrom the perspective of both domestic and
international law, the practice of secret killings conducted outside
conventional combat settings, undertaken on an institutionalized and
external
systematic basis, and with extremely limited if any verifiable
374
one."
regressive
and
disturbing
accountability, is a deeply
For the U.S. RPA operations, much of the problem with transparency
and accountability comes from the question of who is running the
targeted killing operations outside the active battlefields of Iraq and
Afghanistan. Although U.S. government officials are careful to avoid
referencing the CIA when addressing RPA operations in public forums
and publicly released documents, it is now undisputable that the CIA is
significantly involved in running operations in all countries outside of
Iraq and Afghanistan. 375 Because these particular operations are run by
the CIA, secrecy shrouds the operations in different ways than if the
Department of Defense (DOD) ran all the operations. As stated in the
New Yorker,
because of the CIA program's secrecy, there is no visible system
of accountability in place, despite the fact that the agency has
killed many civilians inside a politically fragile, nuclear-armed
country with which the U.S. is not at war. Should something go
wrong in the CIA's program ... it's unclear what the consequences
3 76
would be.

Whether and to what extent the CIA is conducting RPA targeted
killing operations presents many complex questions about the legality of
373. Compare,e.g., Alston, supra note 18, at 287 (asserting that "none of the many existing
oversight mechanisms have been even minimally effective in relation to targeted killings, and that
the resulting legal 'grey hole' cannot be justified on national security grounds"), and Daskal,
supra note 72, at 1218 (noting that there is "no public accounting, or even acknowledgement of
most strikes, their success and error rates, or the extent of any collateral damage" and arguing that
transparency would serve several important functions), with McNeal, supra note 19, at 758-93
(discussing the process that includes "countless bureaucrats making incremental decisions that
ultimately lead to the killing of individuals on a target list" and arguing that there are extensive
forms of bureaucratic, legal, political, and professional accountability mechanisms in place).
374. Alston, supra note 18, at 289.
375. See, e.g., Tara McKelvey, Inside the Killing Machine, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 13, 2011),
http://www.newsweek.com/inside-killing-machine-68771 (writing about her interview with John
A. Rizzo, former CIA acting general counsel, who elaborated on the CIA's procedures for targeted
killing operations).
376. Mayer, supra note 4, at 4. See also Special Rapporteur Report (Emmerson), supra note
38, 46 (noting that "even the existence of the CIA programme in Pakistan remains technically
classified . . . [a] stance [that] has become increasingly difficult to justify, especially because
remotely piloted aircraft operations in Pakistan have been publicly acknowledged by the President
and Secretary of State").
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unprivileged belligerents conducting combat operations. 377 Due to the
depth and complexity of these issues, and because there is no publiclyavailable evidence that anyone other than uniformed military members
are performing these operations for the United Kingdom and Israel, this
Article does not address these issues. Instead, this Article mentions this
issue here merely to note that the use of an agency other than the U.S.
Department of Defense increases the secrecy that surrounds the U.S. RPA
targeted killing operations.
b. United Kingdom
For the United Kingdom, the proportionality analysis sounds very
similar to that of the United States. The LOAC Manual lists factors to
balance, including the importance of the military objective and any
civilian death or injury that may result, and the amount of property
damage or incidental casualties caused by the operation.3 78 The rules for
the United Kingdom also direct "canceling, suspending, or re-planning
the operation if the operation
"may be expected to offend the
379
proportionality principle."
Unlike the U.S. Manual, the U.K. LOAC Manual also addresses the
consideration of risk to its own U.K. forces when assessing
proportionality. The Manual acknowledges that a particular method of
attack may increase the risk to attacking forces while minimizing risks to
civilians, and that the proportionality principle does not require attackers
to accept increased risk.38 0 However, the Manual then indicates that the
United Kingdom leans towards requiring the military force to accept
38 1
increased risk if doing so would reduce collateral risks to civilians.
Specifically, if "alternative, practically possible methods of attack would
reduce collateral risks," the U.K. forces "may have to accept the increased
risk as being the only way of pursuing an attack in a proportionate

377. For a further in-depth discussion on the CIA's operations, as well as the challenge of
confirming the extent of CIA involvement, see generally Alston, supra note 18, at 341-80
(discussing the blurring of the lines of authority between the CIA and DOD and how it can lead
to less congressional oversight when it is unclear which activity falls under the armed services or
intelligence congressional committees); McNeal, supra note 19, at 14-15 (discussing the
overlapping authorizations given to the CIA and DOD to target and kill terrorists around the
world, which may contribute to confusion over who runs which operations); Radsan & Murphy,
supra note 4, at 1215-24 (addressing how the secrecy that surrounds the CIA's RPA program has
led to wide disagreement on the CIA's success in minimizing collateral damage and in achieving
military objectives).
378. J.S.P. 383, supra note 158,
2.6.1 & 2.6.3.
379. Id.
380. ld. 2.7.1.
381. Id.
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38 2

Because the U.K. operations are run in coordination with the United
States, it is very difficult to determine the U.K. civilian casualty rates.
According to the U.K. MOD, the acceptable civilian casualty rate for
purposes of RPA operations in Afghanistan is zero. 383 In other words,
their policy is that weapons will not be discharged unless there is "zero
expectation of civilian casualties, and that any individual or location
should be presumed
to be civilian in nature unless there is clear evidence
384
contrary."
the
to
U.K. Government officials claim only one civilian incident as a result
of an RPA operation by the United Kingdom in Afghanistan.385 During
this incident, two insurgents and four civilians were killed, and two other
civilians injured.386 Similar to critics of the U.S. RPA program, critics of
the U.K. RPA operations believe the numbers of civilian casualties are
higher than the government admits.387 Specifically, one critic claims the
numbers should be higher based on the overall number of strikes that have
been reported, as well as media reports of other casualties, but his
requests to obtain detailed information through the Freedom of
Information Act have been blocked.388
Regarding the operations in Libya, the U.N. Special Rapporteur
appointed to research the RPA targeted killing operations conducted a
study in September of 2013, and determined that the campaign was
"highly precise.., with determination to avoid civilian casualties. ' '389
Some civilian deaths were reported, and an investigation was
recommended, but the precise number of civilian casualties is still
unknown.390 The U.K. MOD conducted its own investigations into the

few reported civilian casualties and determined that none of the reported
incidents involved a British RPA operation, thus implying fault on behalf
of the United States, though the investigation report remains classified.39 '
In addition to disputing civilian casualty rates provided by the
Government, critics of the U.K. program claim it is shrouded in
secrecy.392 Not unexpectedly, this claim is roundly rejected by the U.K.
Secretary of Defence, Philip Hammond, who asserted that "[t]he MOD is
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id.
Special Rapporteur Report (Emmerson), supra note 38,
Id.
Shiner & Carey, supra note 23, 2.3.
Id.
Id. 2.2.

75.

388. Id.

389. Id. 36.
390. Id.
391.

Id.

392. See id; see also Cole, supra note 23,
requested information).
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just as open about its use of unmanned aircraft as it is of its many other
air assets." 393 In an effort to increase transparency, the MOD hosted
journalists at an Air Force base, RAF Waddington, to introduce them to
the military members
working on the RPAs there and show them the work
394
of the operators.
Also, related to proportionality, the U.K. LOAC Manual addresses
"modem, smart weaponry" and posits that the military planner "needs not
only to assess what feasible precautions can be taken to minimize
incidental loss but also to make a comparison between different methods
of conducting operations, so as to be able to choose the least damaging
method compatible with military success." 395 For RPAs, the U.K. MOD
positions a legal team at its Development, Concepts, and Doctrine Centre
that conducts the review of new weapons prior to using them in military
operations, as required by the Geneva Conventions. 396 The team reviews
the various unmanned systems that the United Kingdom has and will be
397
acquiring.
c. Israel
In Israel, the IDF must apply the principle of proportionality to every
case in which they want to use force in their armed conflict against
terrorists. 398 Proportionality requires a difficult balancing test between'
the "state's duty to protect the lives of its soldiers and civilians" and "its
duty to protect the lives of innocent civilians harmed during attacks on
terrorists." 399 While acknowledging that the hardest cases are those
between two extreme samples, the High Court of Justice gives some
guidance as to what those extremes would be:
Take the usual case of a combatant, or of a terrorist sniper shooting
at soldiers or civilians from his porch. Shooting at him is
proportionate even if as a result, an innocent civilian neighbor or
passerby is harmed. That is not the case if the building is bombed
40
from the air and scores of its residents and passersby are harmed. 1
The Court also stressed that the military advantage of the operation
must be "direct and anticipated" to justify harm to civilians or civilian
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.
399.
400.

Hammond, supra note 3.
See Hammond, supra note 3.
U.K. LOAC Manual, supra note 158.
J.D.N. 2/11, supra note 3, 503-10.
Id.
H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50,
41-46.
Id. 46.
Id.
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objects.4"'
Similar to the United Kingdom, Israel may require the military forces
to consider accepting some risk of harm to themselves in order to lessen
harm to the civilians, even those taking part in the hostilities. The Court
notes that, while it is "not required" that soldiers take on greater risk in
order to capture someone, rather than kill or injure them, soldiers should
choose to employ "the means whose harm to the human rights of the
harmed person is smallest," and must always consider the "possibility"
that could mean higher risk to the soldier.4 °2 The Court's reference to
human rights of the targeted individual, even if that person is participating
in hostilities, likely reflects the difference between engaging in armed
combat and the police powers of the belligerent occupying another's
territory.
On the other hand, unlike the United Kingdom, the IDF refuses to
accept the zero civilian casualty rate on its operations. 403 Israel objects to
the imposition of the standard because it "goes beyond the mandatory
requirements of international humanitarian law and would remain
unattainable whilst legitimate military targets, particularly in Gaza, use
civilian institutions as a base for military operations. "404
The IDF try to limit civilian casualties instead by taking certain
operational measures to limit casualties. 40 5 Before sending RPAs into
Gaza to conduct a strike, the IDF will warn the civilian population of an
impending attack by sending phone calls and text messages, or dropping
leaflets.40 6 The IDF also practices aborting airstrikes when civilians are
spotted in the area, and "roof knocking" (in other words, dropping loud
but non-lethal bombs, giving civilians time to leave the area).40 7 In the
2008 Operation in Gaza, for example, IDF gave regional warnings to alert
civilians to leave specific areas before operations commenced, dropped
more than 2.5 million leaflets, and made more than 165,000 phone calls
warning civilians to distance themselves from military targets.40 8
Despite these efforts, since 2006, Israel may have killed as many as
825 individuals with RPAs.4 09 It is unclear how many of the strikes are
401. Id.
402. Id. 40.
403. Emmerson ThirdReport to HR.C., supra note 119, 30.
404. Id.
405. Id.
406. Israeli Defense Forces, Hamas' Goal is to Kill IsraeliCivilians, IDF BLOG (Nov. 21,
2012), http://www.idfblog.com/2012/11/22/operation-pillar-of-defense-summary-of-events/che
cklistinfographic/.
407. Israel Defense Force, How is the IDF Minimizing Harm to Civilians in Gaza?, IDF
Blog (July 16, 2014), http://www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/16/idf-done-minimize-harm-civilian
s-gaza/.
408. Operation in Gaza, supra note 160, 8.
409. Scott Wilson, In Gaza, Lives Shaped by Drones, WASH. POST (Dec. 3, 2011),
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attributable to RPAs or the result of Apache helicopter strikes or F-16
missions, aided by drone surveillance. 4 10 Like both the United States and
United Kingdom, Israel's RPA targeted killing operations are facing
criticism due to the secrecy surrounding the operations. 41' Although
Israel admits to conducting RPA strikes and that targeted killings are part
of its war against Hamas, the IDF has not publicly released numbers of
RPA targeted killings operations conducted, militants killed, or civilian
casualties. 41 2 The failure to release information leads to government
watchdog groups attempting to assess numbers based on the groups' own
research. Thus, for example, the Palestinian Center for Human Rights
estimates that of the 825 Palestinians killed by RPA strikes in Gaza, most
have been "civilians mistakenly targeted or caught in the 'deadly shrapnel
shower' of an RPA strike. 41 3
d. Comparing the Countries: Transparency and Accountability
Some major lessons are learned from comparing the application of the
proportionality principle by the three countries. First, based on the
proportionality principle, assuming that RPAs are at least as precise as
other types of weapons, there is no reason that RPAs cannot be used to
target terrorists. They may, in fact, offer benefits over other lethal options
assuming they are more precise than other types of weapons by reducing
danger not only to military personnel who can operate them from41 a4
distance, but also to civilians who are not the target of the strike.
According to government officials from each of the three countries,
senior level individuals have performed weapons reviews on the RPAs
and determined that, in principle, there is no reason that RPAs must be
categorically excluded as an available weapon. As noted above, the
United Kingdom lists the specific office that performs its weapons
reviews and the United States indicated that senior government officials
performed this type of review before ever using RPAs.
Second, as evident from a review of all three countries, it is very
difficult to assess whether RPAs are as precise as claimed due to the
secrecy that surrounds the operations. All three countries-not just the
United States-have refused to publish specific numbers of strikes and
civilian casualties involved in those strikes. Thus, nongovernmental
organizations are stepping up to try to fill the vacuum of information
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-gaza-lives-shaped-by-drones/20

11/

1/30/glQAjaP600_print.html.
410.

Id.

411.
412.
413.
414.

Id.
Emmerson Third Report to H.R.C., supra note 119,
Dobbing & Cole, supra note 26, at 16.
Brennan, supra note 29.
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publicly available, and it is highly unlikely that the numbers are accurate
based on where these groups must obtain their information.
The "task of describing the government's policies in detail should not
fall to anonymous sources, confidential interviews, and selective
' A better method is for the government itself to
leaks."415
defend the
process it uses to conduct the proportionality review by publishing
unclassified information. The governments could publish information
about how they perform the proportionality test for using RPAs in each
operation, including acceptable numbers of civilian casualties. This
number will vary depending on the circumstances of the particular
conflict. 416 Information excluded from public release would be any
classified information about future operations or even information from
past operations that may endanger future operations or the lives of people
involved in the operations.
Part of the government's proportionality test should include a
balancing test that must be done each time an RPA targeted killing
operation during the planning phase, including an assessment of whether
any potential collateral damage will be excessive in relation to the
particular military objective of that strike. More specifically, the
balancing must be the importance of taking out that particular individual
against any civilian casualties, not only to the civilians themselves but
also to civilian objects. Thus, not only who is targeted, but where and
when also becomes important under proportionality.
Another part of the proportionality analysis that is carried out by the
United Kingdom and Israel, but potentially not by the United States, is an
assessment of whether military members must consider accepting risk to
themselves before conducting an operation. Both the United Kingdom
and Israel require their military members to at least. consider the
possibility that, in order to employ the less harmful means, it may require
the soldier to accept more risk. Not one of the three countries requires
their military members to actually accept the risk, but the United
Kingdom and Israel to require them to consider accepting more risk in
order to capture or otherwise stop the combatant or civilian taking part in
hostilities rather than use lethal force against them.
It is unclear if this "risk to forces" obligation considered by the United
Kingdom and Israel has to do with the fact that the U.K. obligations under
415. McNeal, supra note 19, at 791.
416. The United States at one point used an acceptable casualty rate of thirty in Iraq, whereas
the acceptable rate in Afghanistan was one. The United Kingdom claimed the acceptable civilian
casualty rate was zero for Afghanistan, which is interesting considering its operations were
conducted in coordination with the United States. Israel roundly rejects zero as an acceptable
civilian casualty rate in its operations. This Article does not advocate for a specific rate, which
will change based on the operation, but merely that the rate be made publicly available at some
point, even if that point is after the conclusion of the operation.
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IHRL are greater than the United States and Israel, or due to Israel's status
as an occupying power. Regardless, under its current legal obligations,
the United States would not have to change its practice and accept this
principle in order to meet its legal obligations under IHL.
One final point in this Part is that, although Israel rejects zero as an
acceptable civilian casualty rate, the IDF attempts to warn the local
civilian population of an impending strike, including pamphlet drops,
sending text messages and phone calls, and "roof-knocking. 4 17 In doing
so, Israel is imposing an additional legal obligation upon itself not
required under the 1949 Geneva Conventions to which it is party. It is a
requirement under Article 57(2)(c) of Geneva Convention Additional
4 18
Protocol I.
Specifically, under that article, parties to a conflict must
give effective advance warning of attacks which may affect the civilian
population, unless circumstances do not permit. 419 There is no indication
that either the United States or the United Kingdom engages in this kind
of warning system for any of their RPA strikes. Of course, the legal
obligation to warn in advance of attacks is a legal obligation on the United
Kingdom, as a party to Additional Protocol I, but not Israel or the United
States, as non-parties. One might also argue that this obligation is
imposed on Israel as an occupying power, under the basic premise that
Israel has a heightened responsibility of protection for non-combatants
who live in the occupied territory.
In practice, sending an advance warning of an impending RPA
targeted strike is not a reasonable operational measure. Although warning
the civilian population, it would also serve as a warning to a target, likely
causing him to go into hiding, and ruin the operation. In most operations,
it is likely that circumstances would not permit advance warning to the
civilian population of the strike because targets do not stay static. Because
the targets are terrorists who are aware that States, such as the United
States, have the capability to target them with RPAs, they are likely
already very cautious about their movements and work to minimize the
risk of being successfully targeted. The alternative argument is that for
any operation in which circumstances would permit (particularly in those
zones outside of active hostilities) sending a general warning that
particular individuals are dangerous and could be targeted by the United
States or the United Kingdom could help avoid civilian casualties by
urging civilians to stay away. If the RPA has been maintaining
surveillance of the target for days beforehand, the warning could be timed
such that the RPA could maintain that surveillance on the target, ensuring
fidelity that the correct individual is being targeted and in a location that
417. Israel Defense Force, supra note 407.
418. Additional Protocol I, supra note 88, art. 57(2)(c).
419. ICRC Rules, supra note 248, at 62.
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is safest for civilians. Yet, if RPA targeted killing operations are executed
correctly, the advance warning would not be needed for the United States
and the United Kingdom. Because both countries accept a zero civilian
casualty rate, then the individuals targeted would only be subject to a
strike when outside the presence of civilians.
4. Humanity
The principle of humanity forbids the infliction of suffering, injury, or
destruction unnecessary for or disproportionate to accomplishment of the
military objective. 420 It is also sometimes referred to as the principle
against unnecessary suffering. 42 1 This principle is focused on the
unnecessary suffering of combatants, not civilians, since other rules apply
to the avoidance of any harm to civilians. 422 For example, this principle
serves as the basis for the prohibition against certain weapons being used,
such as poison and explosive bullets, which increase
suffering of the
423
combatant without increasing the military advantage.
a. United States
In the United States, the Air Force Operational Law Book emphasizes
that the unnecessary suffering principle is used "in an objective rather
than subjective sense., 4 24 That means "the measurement is not that of the
victim affected by the means, but rather in the sense of the design of a
particular weapon or in the employment of weapons. 425 The
determination of whether a weapon or weapons system violates the
unnecessary suffering principle is made at the national level in the United
States, thereby "permitting commanders to assume that weapons ...
issued to them for battlefield use do not violate this aspect of the
426
prohibition on unnecessary suffering.,
In public speeches, senior administration officials have made passing
references to the humanity principle, without detailing how the United
420. J.S.P. 383, supra note 158, 2.4; see also SOLIS, supra note 6, at 269-72.
421. AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SCHOOL, supra note 254, at 15-16.
422. SOLIS, supra note 6, at 270.
423. Id.
424. AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SCHOOL, supra note 254, at 14.
425. Id.
426.

THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION SYSTEM, DOD DIRECTIVE 5000.1 (Oct. 30, 2002). It is

interesting that the United States conducts its weapons assessment under the humanity principle,
while the United Kingdom asserts the weapons assessment is tied more to proportionality. This is
likely a distinction without a difference, so long as both countries are performing the weapons
assessment to determine whether the weapon being assessed will cause the least amount of
damage or injury necessary to meet the military objective. AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL
SCHOOL, supra note 254, at 16.
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42 7
States applies the principle when contemplating use of RPAs overseas.
However, use of RPAs has been approved and if precise, RPAs would
cause death without causing any suffering. Additionally, senior
government officials also repeatedly assert that an individual will not be
targeted by an RPA strike if that individual can be captured. This standard
is one that is higher than IHL, which does not require an attempt to
42 8
capture your enemy before using lethal action against that enemy.

b. United Kingdom
For members of the U.K. military, the LOAC Manual states that the
"principle of humanity is based on the notion that once a military purpose
'42 9
has been achieved, the further infliction of suffering is unnecessary.
Thus, "if an enemy combatant has been put out of action by being
wounded or captured, there is no military purpose to be achieved by
continuing to attack him., 4 30 The principle of humanity when applied to
RPA targeted killing operations seems to mean something similar for the
United Kingdom than the United States, that it1 only contemplate
43
conducting an RPA strike if capture is impossible.
c. Israel
Similar to the other two countries, the IDF asserts that targeted killings
are an exceptional step taken when no other alternative exists. 432 By
requiring a sort of "less harmful means" test, the High Court of Justice
also conditioned a targeted killing on the inability of that individual to be
captured or otherwise disabled.4 3 3 Specifically, the Court imposed on
soldiers the obligation to "choose the means whose harm to the human
rights of the harmed person is smallest. Thus, if a terrorist taking direct
part in hostilities can be arrested, interrogated, and tried, those are the
4 34
means which should be employed.

427. See, e.g., Brennan, supra note 29 (noting that "targeted strikes conform to the principle
of humanity which requires us to use weapons that will not inflict unnecessary suffering"); Holder,
supra note 29 (asserting that "any such use of lethal force by the United States will comply with
the four fundamental law of war principles governing use of force .... [including,] the principle
of humanity"); DOJ White Paper, supra note 138, at 8 (citing the four fundamental principles and
stating that "it is a premise here that any such lethal operations by the United States would comply
with the four fundamental law-of-war principles").
428. Blum & Heymann, supra note 11, at 158.
429. J.S.P. 383, supra note 158, 2.4.1
430. Id.
431. See supra text accompanying note 145.
432. See supra text accompanying notes 332-43; H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 13.
433. H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 40.
434. Id.
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d. Comparing the Countries: IHRL Standard?
The major lesson gleaned from comparing the three countries'
application of the humanity principle is that all three may be going further
than actually required by IHL before conducting an RPA targeted strike
operation. Each government claims that no other means of force, other
than lethal force, can eliminate the threat, and that is the burden that
government officials will determine is met before launching an RPA
targeted killing operation. 435 This implies the governments are
considering all other methods and determining none other than the option
of lethal force are adequate. This high burden, which seems to be
accepted by all three countries, is a "depart[ure] from the traditional
armed conflict" and "more easily situated within a law enforcement
model of regular policing operations. 436 At least with regard to this one
principle of IHL, the three countries using RPAs to target and kill
terrorists are placing upon themselves a higher standard than required by
IHL, one drawn from LHRL.
Other than the assertions that RPA targeted killing operations are used
only as exceptional measures, there is really no further information on
how the governments are making the determination that capture is
infeasible.437 In military operations, this assertion by government
officials may be the only information available and further information
cannot be shared with the public at the time of the operation. The
assessment of the operational environment in an area of active hostilities
or a location where an imminent threat resonates is an assessment that
should only be made by military commanders familiar with the available
intelligence. For the United States, the President has been heavily
involved in deciding whether a particular RPA operation will be
conducted.
[I]t is generally understood that the President's Commander in
Chief powers under Article II [of the Constitution] cloak him with
the power to make tactical decisions on the battlefield. Arguably,
this is the source of the President's power to direct the battlefield
tactic of using drones to kill enemy combatants.438

435.
436.

See supra notes 332 & 431; H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50.
Blum & Heymann, supra note 11, at 158.

437.

See, e.g., Peter Grier, Can Drone Strikes Target US Citizens? Critics say Rules are

Vague, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 5, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/DC-Decoder/
2013/0205/Can-drone-strikes-target-US-citizens-Critics-say-rules-are-vague.
438. Gonzales, supra note 266, at 27.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/fjil/vol26/iss3/3

72

Westbrook Mack: Remotely Piloted Aircrafts (RPAs) in Targeted Killing Operations:

REMOTELY PILOTED AIRCRAFTS (RPAs) IN TARGETED KILLING OPERATIONS

C. Accountabilityfor Casualties (UnderIHL andIHRL)
Beyond overall transparency in certain aspects of RPA targeted killing
operations, in which all three countries could improve, there is one area
of accountability in which Israel and the United Kingdom seem to be
doing more than the United States, at least in law and stated policy if not
yet completely in practice. That area is accounting for civilian casualties
post-operation and making that information publicly available at some
point.
There is no obligation under IHL to conduct a full and complete
investigation into every civilian death. To impose an obligation on men
and women engaged in an armed conflict to return to a battlefield postconflict and try to determine all the casualties on the other side of the
conflict would be completely unreasonable and impractical. There are
obligations under customary international law, however, to take "feasible
measures" to try to account
for missing persons, 439 and to try to account
440
dead.
for and identify the
Specifically, the ICRC has collected evidence that a duty to "search
for, collect and evacuate the dead without adverse distinction" exists in
both international and non-international armed conflicts. 4 4 1 This duty
applies to each party to the conflict, but includes many qualifiers
including "[w]henever circumstances permit," "particularly after an
engagement," and that the parties must "without delay, take all possible
measures." 442 Thus, the duty is recognized as one of means that will not
be available in every circumstance. The ICRC also gathered evidence of
state practice that "[w]ith a view to the identification of the dead, each
party to the conflict must record all available information prior to
disposal. 443
According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur, Ben Emmerson, because
countries have a duty to protect civilians in an armed conflict "in any case
in which there have been, or appear to have been, civilian casualties that
were not anticipated when the attack was planned, the [country must]
conduct a prompt, independent and impartial fact-finding inquiry and to
provide a detailed public explanation of the results. 4 4 4 The obligation is
"triggered whenever there is a plausible indication from any apparently
reliable source that unintended civilian casualties may have been
sustained, including where the facts are unclear or the information is
partial or circumstantial," and regardless of "whether the attack was [by
439. ICRC Rules, supra note 248, at 421.
440.

Id. at 417.

441. Id. at 406.
442. Id.
443.

Id. at417.

444. Emmerson ThirdReport to H.R.C., supra note 119,
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an RPA] or other means.... ",445
Under IHRL, when a death occurs at the hands of the government, the
government is obligated to account for the death.4 4 6 The government must
447
conduct an investigation and it must be an independent investigation.
The "investigation should be designed to determine whether the use of
deadly force was justified and should lead to identification and
punishment of those responsible if the use of force was illegal., 448 There
should also be a "sufficient element of public scrutiny of the investigation
449
or its results to secure accountability in practice as well as in theory."
1. United States
Indications are that the. United States conducts some sort of postoperation investigation, although the United States has not published
detailed information regarding the investigations. The U.S. Army
partially declassified and released one post-operation investigation of a
2010 RPA operation in Afghanistan. 45 0 The report found fault with some
of the actions of the military members and recommended administrative
and disciplinary sanctions. 451 The U.N. Special Rapporteur called the
investigation report "a model of accountability and transparency"
and
452
suggests that it "sets a benchmark to be followed in other cases."
Of the potentially hundreds of other RPA operations, the United States
453
has not released information regarding post-operation investigations.
Following some operations, when pressed by outside sources, the United
States later admitted to civilian casualties it initially denied. As an
example, following one RPA operation in Afghanistan, the U.S. and
Afghan military forces initially denied any civilian casualties until asked
to investigate further by the U.N. Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and
445. Id
446. See Murphy & Radsan, supra note 6, at 447-48 (discussing cases that "root[] the duty
to investigate in an express right to life").
447. AI-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, 164, at 656.
448. Murphy & Radsan, supra note 6, at 447.
449. Id. (quoting McKerr v. United Kingdom, 2011-III Eur. Ct. H.R., 9 111-15).
450.

Emmerson ThirdReport to H.R.C., supra note 119,

37; PoorlyFunctioningCommand

and OperationalReporting Led to Feb. Airstrike that Killed 23 Afghan Civilians, BNO NEWS
(May 29,2010), http://bnonews.com/urgent/3425/poorly-functioning-command-and-operationalreporting-led-to-feb-airstrike-that-killed-23-afghan-civilians/ (noting that the Army General in
charge said the civilian casualties resulted from a combination of poorly functioning command
posts in Afghanistan and inaccurate and unprofessional reporting from the RPA crew operating
out of an Air Force base in Nevada).
451. Emmerson Third Report to H.R.C., supra note 119, 37.
452. Id.
453. See id.
T$40-62 (listing multiple operations where civilians have reportedly been killed
in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia, and calling on the United States to investigate the
incidents and release information about them).
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later confirmed some civilian casualties.454
2. United Kingdom
In the United Kingdom, the MOD set up a specific internal review
455
process for every discharge of a weapon from an RPA in Afghanistan.
Specifically, after any operation where an RPA is used, the most senior
military officer at the operations center and his or her legal advisor must
review the operation and prepare a report, including video footage and
communications reports. 4 16 When allegations of any civilian casualties
are made, an investigation must be conducted by authorities into those
deaths. 457 The investigation is conducted by the Joint Incident
are independent of the chain of
Assessment Team, "whose personnel
458
command involved in any strike."
The U.K. obligations seem directly related to the heightened
responsibilities under IHRL. In Al-Skeini and Others v. the United
Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights extended the IHRL
obligation to investigate civilian casualties to the British military in
Iraq. 459 The Court noted that, even in an armed conflict in the territory of
another state where
obstacles may be placed in the way of investigators and .. .
concrete constraints may compel the use of less effective measures
of investigation or may cause an investigation to be delayed,...
the obligation to safeguard life entails that.., all reasonable steps
must be taken to ensure that an effective, independent investigation
is conducted.46 °
The effectiveness of the investigation will depend on whether it leads
"to a determination of whether the force used was ...

justified in the

circumstances and to the identification and punishment of those
responsible.",46 ' The Court also required that the authorities take
"reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the
454. Id. 46.
455. Special Rapporteur Report (Emmerson), supra note 38, 49; see also A1-Skeini v.
United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, 29, at 605 (discussing the various entities that were
charged with investigation Iraqi civilian casualties at the hands of British military members and
finding violations of IHRL where investigations were not conducted by independent
investigators).
456. Special Rapporteur Report (Emmerson), supra note 38, 49.
457. Id. Al-Skeini, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589, 27, at 604-05.
458. Special Rapporteur Report (Emmerson), supra note 38, 49.
168-69, at 656-58.
459. Al-Skeini, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R.589,
460. Id. 164, at 656.
461. Id. 166, at 657.
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incident, including inter alia, eye-witness testimony, forensic evidence
and, where appropriate, an autopsy which provides a complete and
an objective analysis of clinical findings,
accurate record of injury and 462
death.,
of
cause
the
including
The United Kingdom may not be fully meeting its obligations to
investigate every operation. The U.N. Special Rapporteur specifically
requested that the United Kingdom declassify and publish results of an
investigation into an RPA operation in March 2011 in Afghanistan where
four women and children, who were not participating in hostilities, may
have been killed.463
In light of the Special Rapporteur's report, on February 25, 2014, the
European Parliament passed a resolution, by 534 votes to 49, on the use
of armed drones. 464 The resolution specifically called for States, in the
face of information that civilian casualties resulted from an RPA strike,
to "conduct prompt, independent investigations and, if the allegations are
proved correct, to proceed to public attribution of responsibility,
punishment of those responsible and provision of access to redress,
including payment of compensation to the families of victims." 465 The
European Parliament also called on the European Union to "promote
greater transparency and accountability on the part of third countries...
victims of
to allow for judicial review of drone strikes and to ensure that
466
unlawful drone strikes have effective access to remedies."
3. Israel
Citing cases from the European Court of Human Rights, the Israeli
High Court of Justice determined that IDF are required to perform an
investigation on the lawfulness of the lethal force whenever civilian
deaths occur. 467 Specifically, "after an attack on a civilian suspected of
taking an active part, at such time, in hostilities, a thorough investigation
regarding the precision of the identification of the target and the
circumstances of the attack upon him is to be performed (retroactively)."
468 As with the United Kingdom, the investigation performed by the IDF
must be independent. 469 Furthermore, the Israeli High Court emphasized
the importance of the record of the procedure by which the targeted
462.

Id.

463.

Emmerson Third Report to H.R.C., supra note 119,

39.

464. European Parliament Resolution on the use of armed drones, 2014/2567 (RSP) (Feb.
25, 2014), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef--//EP//TEXT+
MOTION+P7-RC-2014-0201 +0+DOC+XML+VO//EN&Ianguage=en.
465. Id.
466. Id. C.
467. H.C.J. Opinion, supra note 50, 40.
468. Id.
469. Id.
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killing operated was considered and47aproved as well as the assessment
of collateral damage post-operation. ?
According to reports from the U.N. Special Rapporteur, evidence
suggests that "competent Israeli authorities" conducted investigations
into the RPA operations and specifically into the deaths of civilians in the
operations. 47 1 The Israeli government released some information on the
investigations, including when no evidence warrants criminal charges,
but the details of the investigations, including reasons for the findings,
were not publicly released. 472
4. Comparing the Countries: Post-Operation Investigation
Both the United Kingdom and Israel impose on their military
members an obligation to investigate civilian deaths after any operation.
Of course, the United States is not obligated to follow the law of the
European Court of Human Rights, the Israel High Court of Justice, or the
European Union Parliament.473 Although the United States does not
apply the ICCPR extraterritorially, the fact that there is state practice, as
well as international jurisprudence, supporting the collection and
identification of the dead, regardless of which party that person belongs
to, demonstrates that the United States may be lagging behind the other
countries in its current RPA targeted killing operations to account for the
dead.
In their law review article, Murphy and Radsan argue that, "[a]fter
using deadly force in counterterrorism operations, executive authorities
should conduct an independent, impartial, prompt, and (presumptively)
public investigation of its legality." 474 They base their arguments on the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution as well as U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence related to detention of an American citizen in Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld,475 and regarding the habeas corpus rights of detainees in
470. Id. 46 (emphasis added); see also Blum & Heymann, supra note 11, at 159 (noting
that the H.C.J. Opinion "placed an emphasis on the procedure by which the targeted killing
operation was considered and approved and on the postfactum debriefing of operations, all in an
effort to improve the record on collateral harm").
471.

Emmerson Third Report to H.R.C., supranote 119,

63-69.

472. Id.
473. See Alston, supra note 18, at 437 (noting that, although the United States properly notes
it is not a party to the European Conventions, the [European Court of Human Rights'] opinion
does directly bind all of the U.S. European allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and
will likely cause a flow-on effect on operations of the United States).
474. Murphy & Radsan, supra note 6, at 446; see also Kretzmer, supra note 78, at 204
("Applying human rights standards in cases of an armed conflict with terrorist groups means that
every case of targeted killings must be subjected to a thorough and credible legal investigation.").
475. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (holding that American citizens held as
enemy combatants were entitled to due process protections).
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Boumediene v. Bush.4 76 Although the Supreme Court cases address
detention of combatants and not whether an investigation is required into
combatant deaths overseas, Murphy and Radsan use the due process
standards set in those cases to argue that the due process requirements
extend to such operations, stating "[i]f due process controls whom the
surely due process
executive may detain in the war on terror, then
477
controls whom and how the executive may kill.,
The reality of the U.S. RPA targeted killing operations-particularly
those in countries outside of Iraq and Afghanistan-would seemingly
provide opportunity for at least a limited post-operation investigation and
legal review. First, to target an individual, an attacker must ensure that he
or she can positively identify, with at least reasonable certainty, that the
person to be killed is a legitimate military target. 478 This means, the
identity of the person must be verified by collecting intelligence on that
person, including surveillance of the patterns of behavior of that person
(also called the pattern of life analysis). 479 The activities and movements
of the targeted individual are tracked, which includes "persistent
collection" of information such as "overnight locations, daily routes,
visitations, and trustworthy associates. ' 48° The significance of this
intelligence collection is that it presents the opportunity for records to be
generated about the particular target, records that may be in the form of
documents or video recordings, and which extend over a certain amount
of time.
Second, even after the constant monitoring, a decision must be made
at the appropriate level of authority about whether that individual will be
targeted. "When all reasonable and known mitigation techniques... have
been exhausted and collateral damage appears unavoidable . . final
authorization for strikes are entrusted to a pre-determined approval
authority. 4 81 The approval authority can vary from the President, the
Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, or a General Officer in the
military.482 The proportionality analysis required under IHL and
conducted by the approval authority 483 provides another opportunity for
the generation of records that is not available in the situation of active
hostilities on the battlefield. And, these important information gathering
476. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008) (holding that non-citizen detainees at
Guantanamo Bay had a constitutional right to seek habeas corpus review in federal courts and that
due process principles would shape the contours of the review).
477. Murphy & Radsan, supra note 6, at 409-10.
478. McNeal, supra note 19, at 733.
479. Id.at 734.
480.

Id. at 735 (citing U.S. DEP'T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL No. 3-60, THE TARGETING

PROCESS (2010), at B-3 (internal quotations omitted)).
481.

Id.at 750.

482.
483.

Id.
See id.
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and decision-making functions all occur before the RPA operation is
conducted.
After the operation, the investigation would include the maintenance
and review of the video feed from the RPA. And, if possible, but only if
circumstances permit, it should include an on-the-ground investigation
by investigators independent of the RPA operators, to include interview
of witnesses and collection of evidence at the scene. Probably, in most
situations, an on-the-ground investigation would be impracticable. The
whole point of the RPA operation in the first place is that capture of the
individual is infeasible. Assuming that to be the case, then it is not
reasonable to then send in a team to investigate the post-operation area
for civilian casualties. They would be at extreme risk. But, the beauty of
RPA operations is that the strike is being recorded as it is occurring. Thus,
valuable information from this feed could be included in the
investigation.
The post-operation investigation would include the review by an
independent investigator, who was not a part of any step in the process of
planning that operation, of all the available video and documents,
including all information that was part of the pre-strike targeting and
decision-making processes. The reviewer should be tasked to answer
questions, such as whether the use of lethal force was justified, whether
the targeted individual was in fact the one killed in the operation, whether
civilians were also killed, and whether the appropriate level of approval
authority authorized the operation. 484 All of these questions will not be
able to be answered in every situation. But, the investigation should be
conducted with an aim to answer them and with the goal of publicly
releasing information that can be unclassified about the operation.
Murphy and Radsan go on to suggest that perhaps the CIA's
Investigator General could conduct the investigation and that some sort
of judicial review could be included, such as a "special national security
court designed along the lines of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court" (FISA). 485 Crandall argues for an ex-ante process, a pre-strike
review tribunal.486 She asserts that the tribunal could be entirely within
the executive, and would include someone such as "an ombudsman or
personal representative with advocacy responsibilities" for each potential
RPA target.487
President Obama has specifically addressed this point and dismissed
it. In his speech at the National Defense University, he comments on
484. See also Murphy & Radsan, supra note 6, at 447 (listing factors suggested by the
European Court of Human Rights in McKerr v. United Kingdom, 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 475, for
state agents investigating deaths that occur under their responsibility).
485. Id. at 448-49.
486. Crandall, supra note 102.
487. Id. at 87.
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options that have been presented:
Each option has its virtues in theory, but poses difficulties in
practice. For example, the establishment of a special court to
evaluate and authorize lethal action has the benefit of bringing a
third branch of government into the process, but raises serious
constitutional issues about presidential and judicial authority.
Another idea that's been suggested - the establishment of an
independent oversight board in the executive branch - avoids those
problems, but may introduce a layer of bureaucracy into national
security decision-making, without inspiring additional public
confidence in the process.488
Setting up an entirely separate ex ante review process, such as a court
or oversight board, is not necessary. There should not be any process that
is before a strike that might interfere with the Commander-in-Chiefs
decision that someone must be killed in order to prevent a terrorist act
against the United States. Judges are not the right individuals to make the
decisions on military targets. 4 89 Military commanders, who serve at the
discretion of the civilian Secretary of Defense and the civilian
Commander-in-Chief, are the ones who have the expertise and training to
make those decisions. Furthermore, a secret court would do little to calm
the critics of the program who would assume that the court was a rubber
stamp for the RPA operations, a critique which would go unanswered in
the face of the court's secrecy.490
investigation would increase
However, a post-operation
accountability for the operations by publicly releasing the basic results of
the investigation, and there is a way to conduct them without implicating
national security concerns. Military members with the appropriate
security clearance and who have the legal experience to be able to
perform these investigations are already in place. Specifically, members
of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps of each service could fulfill
this role. JAGs perform legal reviews of all other types of military
operations, including weapons, targeting, and LOAC issues. 491 JAGs,
488. President Obama Speech, supra note 1, at 5.
489. McNeal, supra note 19, at 126-27 (noting the problems with ex ante judicial review
are numerous, including practical as well as constitutional concerns); see also Scott Shane,
Debating a Court to Vet Drone Strikes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/02/09/world/a-court-to-vet-kill-lists.html?pagewanted=all& r=0; see also Editors, Why a

"Drone Court" Won't Work, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 18, 2013) (noting that "[g] iven the ticking-timebomb nature of drone strikes, seeking judicial approval for an individual strike is impractical").
490. Shane, supranote 489 (noting that "few outraged Pakistanis would be assuaged by the
distinction ofjudicial scrutiny, and civil libertarians would point out that the target is never given
the chance to make a case before the judge").
491.

AIR FORCE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL SCHOOL, supranote 254, at 289-90 (noting that
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with the appropriate security clearance level, from a different chain of
command from the RPA operators could be designated to review the
operations.
Then, once reviewed by the JAG, multiple levels of senior officers
within the military, all the way up to the Secretary of Defense, would get
the opportunity to comment on the report before public release. The
President or his delegate would be the final authority to sign off on the
investigation and release unclassified information to the public. Of
course, separate time tables can be imposed on, first, the investigation
process and, second, on the review process, to ensure delivery to the
public in a relatively timely manner.
Critics of this approach may claim that because JAGs are military
officers, they are not independent. This was also the concern of European
Court of Human Rights in Al-Skeini. The Court found that the Special
Investigation Branch was not independent at the time it performed its
investigation, even though they had a separate chain of command from
the soldiers they were investigating, based on the factual circumstances
surrounding the procedures used.49 2 Specifically, the chain of command
of the implicated soldiers was the authority to decide whether to call in
the investigating authorities, the investigating authorities were not free to
decide when to start and stop an investigation and they had to report to
of the implicated soldiers rather than the
the military chain of command
493
Army Prosecuting Authority.
Applied to U.S. JAGs, a lack of independence claims show an
inaccurate understanding of JAG's mission in the U.S. military. JAGs are
commissioned as military officers to ensure that other members of the
military are following the law, they advise commanders about those times
that they are in danger of violating the law, and they prosecute the
offenders. Appropriate procedures could be established for the postoperations and legal reviews to ensure independence, such as separate
chains of command for the JAG officers appointed to conduct the
investigation than the operators who conducted the strike. The appointed
JAGs would need investigative support from teams of interpreters and
military criminal investigators, and they would require the support of top
leadership to ensure independence.

JAG advisors "ensure a thorough legal analysis is conducted for selected targets, weaponeering,
and assignment of forces," and they also provide legal counsel on LOAC and Rules of
Engagement).
171-74.
492. See A1-Skeini v. United Kingdom, 2011 Eur. Ct. H.R. 589,
493. Id. 172.
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VI. CONCLUSION

By comparing how the United States, the United Kingdom, and Israel
are interpreting and applying the principles of international law to RPA
targeted killing operations, this Article attempts to add to the literature on
RPA targeted killing operations and contribute to the debate on the
legality of such operations. The most challenging aspect of this attempt
was a feature common the operations of all three countries-the secrecy
that surrounds the operations.
All three countries have made some efforts at transparency. The
United States has released multiple documents that explain the legal basis
for the RPA operations. Israel's High Court has weighed in on the issue,
releasing a detailed opinion on targeted killings, and Israel's Defence
Forces publish some documents on its website explaining how they apply
the law to their operations. Finally, the United Kingdom conducted
investigations into some of its operations and worked with the United
Nations to release some details. The fact is, however, that many details
of the operations, including how many operations have been conducted,
whether civilian casualties resulted (and how many) from those
operations, and what accountability occurs for civilian deaths or injury,
including injury to civilian objects, remain shrouded in secrecy. Thus, all
three countries need to increase transparency.
One way the United States could achieve increased transparency
would be to publish specific procedural rules that describe the legal
framework for RPA targeted killing operations. This can be done, without
releasing classified details, in a white paper or an executive order similar
to Executive Order 12,333 which sets out rules for covert action. While
the government has released some information, in speeches and
documents discussed throughout this Article, the information provided is
piecemeal, indefinite, and, while purporting to establish some legal
guidelines, is vague. The better route would be to publish a white paper
or an executive order outlining the legal framework for future RPA
targeted killing operations. This would provide transparency and better
accountability, and would also help to shape future U.S. operations within
those legal bounds.
All three countries should engage in at least limited individualized
threat findings for those targeted by the RPAs. In some ways, both the
United States and Israel have indicated they may already be engaging in
a sort of ITF. Israel's High Court requires it and the United States
indicates that it engages in a very robust deliberative and vetting process
before conducting an RPA operation against a particular individual.
Additionally, since the United Kingdom conducts operations with the
United States, it is reasonable to assume that its military officers also
engage in some sort of ITF before targeting a specific individual.
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What are missing are the specifics of how these ITFs are performed.
The countries should precisely define, to the extent possible, the
parameters of and factors included in the ITFs, and publish this
information to the public. This is not an attempt to overburden the
process, but rather a recommendation to declassify some information so
that the public can understand why certain individuals must be and are
targeted. And, part of the ITF is already being done since an assessment
that capture is infeasible is already an obligation the countries follow.
All three countries should also publicly acknowledging most, if not
all, of the RPA strikes made and the known and estimated number of
enemy combatants and civilians killed. To emphasize, this is not to
advocate for a disclosure of the all the details of the operation either
before or after the operation. But, publication of some basic statistics
regarding RPA operations would quiet much criticism. On the one hand,
publishing this information would disprove the widely speculative and
grossly overestimated numbers of civilian casualties being provided by
groups with interests that do not align with those of the governments,
such as other terrorist groups, citizens, or critics who are opposed to the
program. On the other hand, publishing these numbers would show that
the countries are holding themselves personally responsible for mistakes,
which would increase the credibility of the program. Publishing the
numbers would also evince some type of investigative process into
civilian casualties. Finally, rather than treating the results of the RPA
targeted killing program as something to hide behind, the countries
should hold it out to be the unique and promising technology that it is and
should welcome ways to improve its use in times of armed conflict.
As a final recommendation, international law imposes an obligation
to account for casualties in armed conflict. The United Kingdom and
Israel seem to be further along in accepting and trying to meet this
obligation than the United States. Although the United States is neither a
party to the Additional Protocols nor a belligerent occupying power, the
nature of RPA operations opens up the possibility that at least a minimal
investigation in every operation can occur because RPA operations
involve an elaborate process of identifying and conducting surveillance
on the target before the operation, which means that information is
already being gathered on the target. Thus, even in operations where it
would be impossible to send in an investigative team after the strike, a
more limited investigation or review of the operation can still happen. It
is entirely possible (and probable) that the United States is already
conducting some sort of post-operation investigation, but information of
such investigation is not being released to the public. The United
Kingdom and Israel are conducting some post-operation investigations,
but they are not releasing sufficient information to the public following
the investigations. In this way, the governments are actually opening
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themselves up to more criticism by not allowing the public to understand
the necessity of conducting the RPA targeted killing operations.
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